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ABSTRACT
THE CONSEQUENCES OF POOR TAX ADMINISTRATION:
COLLECTIONS, GROWTH, AND EVASION
BY
CHANDLER BLALOCK MCCLELLAN
March 2013
Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation examines three different aspects of tax administration's effect on 
tax revenue collection, economic growth, and tax evasion.  By understanding the role of 
good tax administration, policymakers can pursue effective tax reform, increase tax 
revenues efficiently, and minimize the impact on taxpayers.  
The first study examines shortfalls in tax revenue, or the tax gap.  The tax gap 
arises for a variety of reasons and understanding the root causes of the gap is a necessary 
first step in reducing or eliminating the gap.  This study examines the contribution of four 
factors to the tax gap: willful tax evasion, errors in filing taxes, incompetence in the tax 
administration, and tax collector corruption.  By combining firm level data from 79 
countries with macroeconomic variables, this study finds that complexity leading to 
unintentional tax evasion and poor tax administration are significant drivers of the tax 
gap.  Tax reform that reduces tax code complexity and increases the quality of tax 
administration services provides the largest marginal gains in reducing the tax gap.
The second study uses the same data set to examine the effects of tax enforcement 
measures and tax revenue shortfall on economic growth.  Lower tax revenues have a 
x
theoretically mixed effect on growth as they create more disposable income for 
investment, but simultaniously reduce funds for public goods. This study finds that while 
increased enforcement measures reduce growth, high tax revenue collection serve to 
increase growth.  The results suggest that reforms focusing on increasing revenue without 
resorting to greater enforcement measures are desirable.
The final aspect of tax administration this work examines the the relationship 
between corrupt tax administration and tax evasion.  Since this relationship is 
endogenous, causality is difficult to determine.  Using an instrumental variable approach 
as well as propensity score matching, this study suggests that corruption drives evasion.  
As a result, policy makers should focus on ensuring an honest tax administration, thereby 
addressing both issues simultaneously.
Taken together, the results of this dissertation argue for tax reforms to focus on 
creating a high quality tax administration that focuses on a service paradigm of tax 
collection.  Under the service paradigm, tax authorities provide greater assistance to tax 
payers, creating conditions favorable for compliance without relying on coercive 
enforcement measures.
xi
 Chapter 1: Introduction
Effective tax administration is an issue as old as taxation itself.  The balancing act 
between maximizing tax revenues and minimizing the impact on the populace in which 
the state must engage was evident as early as 2350 BC, when the first recorded tax revolt 
displaced the Sumerian dynasty of the Ur-Nanshe.  This revolt was triggered by both high 
taxes and a harsh and oppressive bureaucracy in which throughout the state “There were 
the tax collectors” (Burg 2004).  Revolts due to harsh taxation policies are not the only 
concern for the state regrading tax administration.  During its decline in the 3rd-4th 
century, the Roman empire, having placed the tax collecting power in the hands of the 
praesides, often found its tax revenue reduced as the more powerful and influential 
collectors failed to send their collections to the empire (Southern 2001).  The history of 
taxation is replete with governments that have failed due to poor taxation administration 
and policies (Burg 2004).
Despite the millennia that have past since the Ur-Nanshe dynasty's downfall, 
today's policymakers are still grappling with the questions of effective tax administration. 
This work is an attempt to address some of those questions of tax administration.  To 
effectively deal with an issue, a policymaker must first know it is an issue.  The first 
portion of this study examines the determinants of the Value Added Tax (VAT) revenue 
shortfalls in an attempt to inform policymakers on where they should focus their efforts.  
The VAT is an important source of revenue for a majority of the world's countries. 
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 Like any tax, the VAT is subject to revenue shortfalls in which collected revenue is less 
than expected collections calculated by the tax rate and tax base.  This tax gap arises for a 
variety of reasons and understanding the root causes of the gap is a necessary first step in 
reducing or eliminating the gap.  
Chapter two examines the contribution of four factors to the tax gap: willful tax 
evasion, errors in filing taxes, incompetence in the tax administration, and tax collector 
corruption.  The first two factors, willful evasion and tax errors, arise from actions taken 
by the taxpayer and can be addressed by the tax administration through higher levels of 
enforcement or enhancing of tax preparation aid respectively.  The last two factors are tax 
administration shortcomings that can be dealt with through administration reform.
Using new firm level data allows the examination of the taxpayer factors, whereas 
before only the tax administration factors could be studied.  By combining data from 79 
countries with macroeconomic variables, this  chapter finds that complexity leading to 
unintentional tax evasion and poor tax administration are significant drivers of the tax 
gap.   Tax  reforms that  reduce tax  code  complexity  and  increase  the  quality  of  tax 
administration services provides the largest marginal gains in reducing the tax gap.
While these reforms would serve to increase tax revenue collections, whether an 
increase in revenue collection serves to promote economic growth  is the next question 
this study seeks to answer.  An extractive government may only care about maximizing 
revenue, but benevolent governments will attempt to maximize their citizens utility.  In 
this respect, if the additional tax revenue from increased collections is more productively 
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 employed by the private sector, the revenue increase will ultimately reduce utility.
The third chapter of this study examines an increase in revenue collections in light 
of  a  theoretical  model  that  incorporates  tax  enforcement  into  an  endogenous  growth 
setting.  Using the same data as the first part of this study and focusing on the VAT again,  
two enforcement factors, the probability of audit and the cost of evasion, are empirically 
tested to find their effects on economic growth.  Additional analyses employing a panel of 
countries and incorporating tax collection efficiencies create a fuller picture of the effects 
of tax enforcement and administration on overall growth.
Consistent with the theoretical model, increased audits and higher evasion costs 
are associated with lower growth, as more resources are used in enforcing and evading 
the tax code.  However, the theoretical model is shown to be incomplete, as results from 
examining the overall collection efficiency ratios show that reduced collections result in 
lower growth as well.   These results  suggest  that focusing on enforcement factors to 
increase revenues may be detrimental to growth.  Instead, other tax reforms that raise 
collection ratios more efficiently may result in higher growth.
The  fourth chapter of  this  study  deals  with  the  relationship  between  tax 
administration  corruption  and  evasion.   While  corruption  and  evasion  often  occur 
together,  with  tax  evaders  bribing  tax  officials  to  abet  their  evasion.   Due  to  this 
simultaneity, the causal relationship between corruption and evasion is not clear.  More 
corrupt societies could enable more tax evasion as corrupt officials seek more income or 
higher  levels  of  tax  evasion  could  drive  corruption by offering  more  opportunity for 
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 bribes.   From a  tax  administration  standpoint,  understanding  this  relationship  allows 
policymakers to address the underlying problem, corrupt officials or criminal taxpayers, 
and thus address both issues at the same time.
First,  this  chapter  develops  a  theoretical  model  incorporating  a  corrupt  tax 
administration  and  tax  evasion  costs  into  the  standard  expected  utility  model  of  tax 
evasion.  The theoretical results show that a higher probability of being inspected by a 
corrupt  auditor  reduces  declared  income,  but  the  bribe  rate  and the  corrupt  official's 
effectiveness in aiding evasion produce an ambiguous effect on evasion rates.
To  empirically  test  these  factors,  this  study  uses  the  same  data  used  in  the 
previous chapters, but conducts the analysis at the firm level instead of the country level. 
Two  methods  are  employed  to  deal  with  the  potential  endogeniety  of  evasion  and 
corruption.   The  first  is  an  instrumental  variable  approach  that  uses  other  types  of 
corruption  as  an  instrument  for  tax  corruption  and  the  second  is  a  propensity  score 
matching analysis in which the firm's experience with corrupt tax collectors is used as a 
treatment.
The results from these analyses suggest that corruption drives higher levels of 
evasion.  A culture of corruption creates the opportunities for and reduces the stigma 
associated with breaking the tax laws.  Without that culture, tax evasion rates would fall 
and governments would collect more in tax revenue.  By focusing reforms on creating a 
better  tax  administration,  policy  makers  can  address  both  problems  and  reduce  both 
corruption and evasion.
15
 While this study attempts to answer these questions regarding tax administration, 
it is important to note the shortcomings which limit the power and scope of this analysis. 
The data used are from surveys of firms from mostly developing countries.  As a result,  
the main tax being analyzed is the VAT.  While an important tax, the VAT is not the only 
tax, and thus generalization of the results to all taxes is problematic.  Next, the structure 
of  the  data  sources  does  not  always  allow  the  most  sophisticated  analysis  to  be 
performed.  Consequently, these results may be capturing other phenomena which may be 
at work and not the relationship being examined.  Finally, data availability, not all of the 
factors  identified  in  the  theoretical  models  can  be  examined and the  factors  that  are 
examined could always be measured with better methods and measurement.  As a result, 
a great deal remains for future work.
Despite these shortcomings and taken together, the results of these three chapters 
indicate that good tax administration is vital.  In this respect, they are consistent with a 
wide body of literature that  affirms the importance of tax administration  (Bird 2004). 
Further they suggest that tax administration reforms should be implemented with a view 
to not only make the administration as honest and competent as possible, but also to make 
it more taxpayer friendly.  This too is in line with an emerging strand of the literature on 
tax reform (Alm and Martinez-Vazquez 2003).
16
 Chapter 2: Mind the Gap: A Decomposition of VAT Collection Efficiency
Introduction
Since its inception in the 1950's in France, the Value Added Tax (VAT) has grown 
to become a major source of revenue for most world governments.  The popularity of the 
VAT lies in several perceived advantages that include vast revenue potential, enhanced 
compliance and administrative attributes, and economic efficiency effects. Currently, 
VATs raise 20% of government revenue and cover over 4 billion people (Keen and 
Lockwood 2010).  Every OECD country, with the exception of the United States, 
implements a VAT, as do the major economies of China, Russia, and India.  As such, a 
VAT is levied on a significant portion of the world's consumption.
The widespread adoption of the VAT has not yet slowed.  First introduced in 
developed European countries, it is now implemented in over 140 countries (see Figure 
2.1).  Several countries that have not yet introduced a VAT are on the verge of doing so, 
particularly in the Caribbean and Middle East regions.   Despite past resistance to the 
VAT, even in the United States pressures to increase federal revenue have recently 
prompted policy makers to broach the idea of instituting a VAT.  Beyond the national 
sphere, the VAT is also becoming an important source of sub-national revenues, with 
several Indian states and Canadian provinces having implemented VATs in the recent 
past.
17
 Figure 2.1: Countries with a VAT
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 Despite the central importance of the VAT to government revenues, any shortfall between 
expected revenue and actual revenue collected may adversely affect government 
operations.  The VAT gap, or the difference between expected and actual revenue, varies 
widely from country to country.  Estimates of the tax gap from EU-25 countries range 
from 1% and 2% of theoretical revenues in Lithuania and Estonia respectively to 23% 
and 30% in Hungary and Greece, with an average gap of 12% (Reckon LLP 2009).  This 
12% gap represents over € 106 billion, or approximately $147 billion, in lost revenue to 
European Union (EU) governments.  Other studies have estimated compliance ratios, or 
actual revenue collection divided by the tax rate times private consumption, that range 
from 10-114%  (Martinez-Vazquez and Bird 2011).  
As is demonstrated by the variation in tax gaps, the quality of tax administration 
may vary widely across countries. The efficiency of a tax authority has several 
implications for a country's tax policy.  Low revenues from weak administration could 
lead to higher tax rates designed to boost revenues which will also increase deadweight 
loss associated with taxation.    Alternatively, different tax structures may be adopted in 
an effort to find the “right” structure, leading to increased costs if the final structure is 
more complex than necessary.  If these policy changes do not address the fundamental 
weakness in tax administration that make changes seemingly necessary, then the changes 
could make a country worse off. 
Tax collections can fall short of expected revenues for several potential reasons.  
Previous studies have examined the role of various factors such as tax structure and 
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 resources available for administration.  This study focuses on two potential channels by 
which a shortfall can occur that have not been extensively studied in the literature, tax 
evasion and tax administration quality.  
Firms, faced with remitting a VAT based on their sales, have an incentive to avoid 
the tax and thus increase their profit, despite the fact that they will get back a credit for 
the VAT paid on the inputs of production.  In the absence of tax enforcement, the taxed 
entity will theoretically pay no taxes, thereby maximizing its profit.  This lack of 
compliance will lead to a shortfall in government revenue, with full non-compliance 
leading to zero revenue.  To counter this behavior, the taxing authority must enforce 
compliance through audits and penalties, with better enforcement leading to higher 
collections.  
Increased enforcement does not guarantee an elimination of tax collections 
shortfalls.  The amount of tax revenue collected depends not solely on how well a tax 
authority enforces compliance or how well the authority is funded, but also on how 
efficiently a tax authority operates in collecting payments.  Even assuming zero tax 
evasion, if the tax authority is not competent or is corrupt, then tax revenues will fall 
short of the expected value.  Understanding which issue, evasion or administration, is 
causing revenue shortfall is a first step in effective tax reform.  While evasion and 
administration are linked, with lax or corrupt administration leading to increased evasion 
and high levels of evasion creating a culture in which corruption is tolerated or perhaps 
spurring tax administration reform, the greatest marginal benefit in reform comes from 
20
 addressing the most pervasive issue.  
In addition to its bearing on tax administration reform issues, an understanding of 
the tax gap also has implications for studies of tax evasion.  Studies that use the 
compliance ratio to examine tax evasion ignore the second component of the tax gap, 
thereby attributing the entire gap to evasion (e.g. Matthews 2003).  This potentially 
creates problems for these studies if the compliance ratio is low due to tax administration 
issues and not evasion.  This study seeks to decompose the tax gap for the VAT to 
determine the amount that is attributable to taxpayer factors such as evasion and mistakes 
and which portion arises from tax authority issues of corruption or incompetence.  
Literature Review
There is a relatively small body of literature examining the causes of the VAT tax 
gap that has grown in recent years.  Early attempts at explaining collection efficiency 
focused on the tax rates and base (Bogetic and Hassan 1993).  While addressing an 
important concern regarding narrow versus wide bases, which is discussed below with 
regard to collection efficiency ratios, this study is fairly limited in scope.  Bogetic and 
Hassan only focus on the complexity of the tax system as represented by multiple tax 
rates and bases.  They found that more complexity and narrower bases reduce tax 
collection efficiency.  While giving some evidence for the policy prescription of a wide 
base with a single rate, this approach does not address other factors potentially affecting 
shortfalls, including evasion and administration effectiveness.  
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 Jack (1996) compares the experiences of VAT adoption in several Central and 
Eastern European nations.  He found two distinct groupings of high and low efficiency 
countries, the study attributes the difference to the treatment of government purchases 
and other exemptions.  Every country's tax code will address different aspects of taxation 
in different ways with the result that in no two countries will have the exact same base.  
This study illustrates that different tax bases could lead to significant differences in tax 
gap measures.  Should one country exempt a certain type of consumption from taxation, 
its tax gap will seem higher than another country that does not exempt that type of 
consumption, regardless of evasion or administration issues.  However, as Jack (1996) 
also notes, there are other drivers of the tax gap, including administration and evasion 
issues, that must be studied in addition to tax structure.  By focusing on taxpayer and tax 
administration factors, my study supplements these works in exploring the causes of tax 
revenue shortfall.  Due to the lack of tax structure measures in the datasets used, this 
study is unable to also account for the factors Bogetic and Hassan and Jack identify.  
However, so long as the structural factors are orthogonal to taxpayer and administration 
factors, then unbiased results will be estimated.
In a case study of Ukrainian VAT efficiency Bird and Gendron (2006) ascribe 
decreases in collection efficiency to degradations in tax administration quality and 
changes in tax policy that narrowed the Ukrainian tax base.  The authors assumed no 
increases in evasion activity over their study period and note that while the Ukrainian gap 
is comparable to with countries such as Italy and Uruguay, it is much higher than the gap 
22
 for countries with tax administrations that are generally recognized as competent, such as 
Chile and the UK.
Incorporating both the VAT rate, the number of different rates, and administration 
costs, Agha and Haughton (1996) find that higher rates and different rates reduce 
collections while administration resources and experience with the VAT serve to increase 
collections.  Again, as with other studies in this vein, the evasion decision made by the 
household is assumed to be solely a function of resources available to the tax authorities.  
As such, this study does not give any consideration to disentangling these effects.
Aizenman and Jinjarak (2008) examine the VAT gap in light of political economy 
considerations.  The theoretical basis for their study rests on the traditional enforcement 
framework in which higher tax enforcement leading to higher collections.  They suggest 
that tax enforcement is neglected in times of political change, thus leading to higher tax 
gaps.  While finding that higher levels of development and political stability reduce the 
tax gap, the authors fail to identify the driving factors behind the smaller tax gaps.  Given 
the enforcement framework, these factors, such as changes in the probability of audit and 
fine rates, encompass both tax evasion and administrative issues.
Esteller-Moré (2005) modeled tax administration at the regional level in Spain.  
Positing that administration efficiency depends on inputs, such as the number of tax 
inspector, which in turn depends on political considerations from the central government, 
this study includes a number of variables capturing tax administration resources.  The 
author attempts to deal with the evasion issue by assuming that evasion is only a function 
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 of enforcement resources and variables.  While there is strong relationship between the 
two variables, evasion rates are not fully determined by tax administration resources.  A 
number of studies have identified other factors, such as tax morale, that affect evasion 
rates (Alm and Torgler 2006, Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee and Torgler 2009, 
Torgler 2007).  By focusing only on administrative factors affecting tax evasion, this 
study gives little insight into these other factors and thus does not complete the picture of 
compliance.
Ebrill et al. (2001) also forgoes attempting to disentangle these effects.  They 
estimated a reduced form models using tax rates and other wider economic variables.  
This study found that economies that have higher tax rates, are more open to trade, are 
more literate, and have more experience with the VAT have higher collections.  The 
author extrapolates that the literacy measure captures a higher quality workforce 
available for the tax administration.  They note, however, that literacy is a rather crude 
proxy for this administration quality.  
Despite the importance of the VAT to national government revenues, only a small 
body of literature has studied the determinants of the tax gap.  The literature that does 
address the factors affecting the gap tends to focus on elements of the tax structure and 
administration or other macroeconomic factors.  When the role of the taxpayer's decision 
to evade is considered, it is assumed to be endogenously determined by tax 
administration factors.  As a result, the current literature largely ignores exogenous 
changes in evasion rates as a determinant of the tax gap.  By failing to account for this 
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 effect, the current literature is subject to omitted variable bias issues.  This study attempts 
to address this issue by including measures of tax administration efficiency and taxpayer 
evasion, thereby disentangling the effects and providing further insight into the structure 
of the tax gap.
Theory and Methods
Tax revenue can fall short for a variety of reasons.  Firms can choose to understate 
sales revenue or overstate deductions, thereby reducing their tax liability and taxes paid 
(Tanzi and Shome 1993).  Additionally, complex tax regulations could result in 
accounting mistakes or discourage filing, leading to discrepancies between actual and 
reported income.  Likewise, the tax authorities could contribute to revenue shortfalls in a 
number of ways.  Corrupt tax agents will seek to appropriate tax revenue for themselves, 
thereby reducing the amount of tax revenue available to the central government.  Further, 
poorly trained or funded tax agents will not be adequately equipped to fully collect all 
revenue due.  The combination of tax evasion and poor or corrupt tax administration 
results in a significant portion of tax revenue shortfall.
Following Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the motives for firms or individuals to 
evade taxes have been grounded in an expected utility framework.  In this framework 
firms and individuals seek to maximize expected utility which is generally a function of 
their respective profit or wealth levels.  In both cases, illicit reduction of tax liability will 
increase profit or wealth levels, which results in higher utility levels.  The cost of 
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 reducing tax liability is the expected value of the penalty from being caught evading 
taxes, resources used in evading taxes and various non-pecuniary costs such as damage to 
reputation or guilt associated with failure to comply with a moral code or societal norms.  
Facing this tradeoff, a rational agent will evade taxes at the level where his marginal 
benefit from evasion equals the marginal costs.
While the economic agent's rational decision making process will result in tax 
evasion, another source of shortfall in tax revenue stemming from the actions of the taxed 
are legitimate mistakes in tax computation.  In addition, tax code complexity also tends to 
increase compliance costs as more time and resources are spent dealing with tax 
regulations.  As compliance becomes more difficult, taxpayers may opt to forgo preparing 
a full return and only remit what can easily be calculated.  Further, a more complex tax 
system offers more opportunity for tax avoidance.  For example, British exemptions on 
low priced imports such as CDs and DVDs allowed online retailers to forgo as much as 
£130m in tax remittances in 2011 (Bowers 2011).  Such increases in tax avoidance 
arising from more complex tax systems also serves to increase the tax gap.
Conversely, increases in complexity could result in more revenue.  Errors in 
calculation could also easily increase a taxpayer's liability.  It has been estimated that 
approximately 8% of filers in the United States overpay their taxes (Smith and Kinsey 
1987).  Given a utility function increasing in wealth, it seems likely that this overpayment 
is the result of mistakes in calculation.  Additionally, Torgler (2003) argues that increased 
complexity enhances notions of equity and that equity and tax compliance are 
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 complementary.  The three effects of broader tax bases, over calculation of taxes and 
enhanced equity, work to decrease the tax gap, thus tax code complexity creates an 
ambiguous effect on the tax gap.  Empirical work on the effects of complexity on 
compliance has yielded inconclusive results, with Vogel (1974) finding a negative effect 
and Clotfelter (1983)  finding a negative effect for non-business returns.  Likewise, 
complexity has been shown to increase VAT compliance costs as well (Hansford, 
Hasseldine and Howorth 2003).  However, Clotfelter also found no effect on business 
returns, as do Forest and Sheffrin (2002) for a wider population of tax returns. 
Complexity in the VAT has also been shown not to affect compliance (Biabani and 
Ramezani 2011).  Regardless, in attempting to explain the components of the tax gap, the 
complexity of the tax code and the potential mistakes arising from that complexity should 
be taken into account.
Differentiating between intentional and unintentional tax evasion is an important 
distinction to make from a policy standpoint.  If the root cause of evasion is primarily 
intentional, then strengthening enforcement policies, such as increasing the fine or audit 
rates, could be pursued as these measures have been shown to reduce evasion.  However, 
if most evasion is the result of unintentional tax errors, then these policies might not be as 
effective at reducing evasion.  Policies aimed at increasing education about the tax 
system or tax reforms to reduce the complexity of the tax system would be more efficient 
methods of reducing the tax gap.
In addition to the two types of taxpayer evasion, intentional and unintentional, 
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 that must be considered when examining the tax gap, the activities of the tax 
administration must be taken into account.  The theoretical literature on tax 
administrations identifies several channels by which weak tax administration can 
contribute to the tax gap problem (Bird 2004).  Corrupt tax officials can appropriate 
revenue before it reaches the government, thereby exacerbating the official tax gap.  
Limited resources and budget constraints can prevent the tax administration from fully 
collected all due taxes.  Finally, given the monopoly the tax administration has on tax 
collections, there is a lack of incentive to innovate and seek better tax collection 
strategies.
Corruption in the tax administration can lead to significant shortfalls in the 
amount of tax revenue that ultimately reaches the government.  Corruption in the tax 
administration can be viewed as a principal-agent problem.  The principal, the 
government, must designate agents, the tax collectors, to administer the tax system and 
ensure revenue flows to the government coffers.  However, the agent's incentives are not 
always aligned with the principal's goals.  In addition to engaging in rent seeking 
behavior to increase his own utility, agents in developing countries can be subject to 
familial or tribal pressures to provide patronage due to their lucrative position (Fjeldstad 
2006).  Poor working conditions or low pay could also induce the agent to engage in 
corruption activities such as accepting bribes to ignore evasion or outright appropriation 
of tax revenue.  This corruption serves to increase the tax gap, and should be accounted 
for in any examination of the tax gap.
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 Even if a tax administration is not corrupt, shortfalls in the necessary resources to 
enforce the tax regulations will hamper its efforts to collect all taxes due.  The tax 
administration apparatus can be viewed as a firm where inputs such as labor and 
infrastructure are used to produce the output of tax revenue.  As such, a successful tax 
administration must have the appropriate level of inputs to fully function (Bird 2004).  
Particularly in developing countries which typically have low civil services salaries and 
limited levels of investment in public infrastructure, it is difficult to recruit qualified and 
educated staff and provide them with the tools, such as computers, to efficiently carry out 
their tasks (Devas, Delay and Hubbard 2001).  Given such resource constraints, tax 
administrations can not fully perform audit activities or even collection activities.  As a 
result, tax revenue that would be collected by a fully funded tax administration is forgone 
and the tax gap widens.
While all these factors contribute to the tax gap, each problem's solution has 
separate policy implications.  To disentangle the tax gap, this study will rely on several 
different measures in an attempt to isolate the effect of each factor.  Based on the 
discussion above, the tax gap in country i can be written as:
Gi= WEi+UEi+Ci+Ai+Oi (1)
where Gi is the tax gap, WEi is the amount of willful evasion, UEi is unintentional 
evasion, Ci is shortfall due to corruption, Ai is shortfall due to lack of resources by the tax 
administration, and Oi are other factors such as multiple tax rates or narrowed bases.  To 
disentangle the effects of these components, it is necessary to determine how prevalent 
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 these factors are and what their contribution is as a share of the tax gap.
Three VAT efficiency ratios relating actual collections to potential collections can 
be calculated depending on which tax base is chosen: the gross collection measure based 
on private consumption expenditure, the VAT efficiency ratio based on GDP, and the C-
efficiency ratio based on total consumption expenditure (Martinez-Vazquez and Bird 
2011).  While the base for each ratio is consumption, each measure is differentiated on 
how consumption is measured.  The gross collection ratio is based on private 
consumption expenditure and is calculated as:
GC=
Rv
τvat∗ConsP
(28)
where GC is the efficiency ratio, Rv  is the total actual revenue collected from the VAT, 
and τvat is the standard tax rate for the VAT and ConsP is private consumption expenditure. 
Similarly, the VAT efficiency ratio and the C-efficiency ratio are calculated as:
VE=
Rv
τvat∗GDP
(29)
CE=
R v
τvat∗ConsT
(30)
where GDP and ConsT are gross domestic product and total consumption expenditure 
respectively.  In each ratio, the denominator gives the total theoretical amount of VAT 
revenue.  
Due to a variety of factors, the actual revenue collected may fall short of this 
theoretical total.  None of the tax bases used in these ratios are actual bases for 
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 functioning VATs.  Exemptions and zero-ratings narrow the base and multiple tax rates 
change the actual denominator further.  Despite these measurement difficulties, ratios 
closer to one still indicate a smaller tax gap while larger gaps are accompanied by smaller 
ratios.
Data
This study will use three separate data sources on taxes.  The first data source, on 
compliance ratios, is the data compiled by Martinez-Vazquez and Bird (2011), covering 
107 countries over a 19 year period from 1990 to 2008.  To disentangle the effects of tax 
evasion, a second data source detailing firm level evasion is used.  This study uses a 
combination of the World Enterprise Survey (WES) and the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), both gathered by the World Bank.  This data 
set provides firm level data covering over 57,000 firms in 79 countries collected in 
several waves over an 8 year period from 1999 to 2009. Combining the Martinez-
Vazquez and Bird data with the WES/BEEPS data results in a cross-sectional 
macroeconomic data set that can be used to examine the tax gap.  In addition, this study 
uses the World Bank Development Indicator (WDI) data that covers similar aspects of 
taxation as the WES firm level data.  This data source provides a robustness check of the 
firm level data in that it covers a slightly different set of countries and provides slightly 
different measures of the variables of interest.  A listing of variables and descriptions used 
in the country-level analysis can be found in Table 2.1 and corresponding summary 
31
 Table 2.1: Description of Variables
statistics in Table 2.2.  Further, Table 2.12 provides correlation coefficients for all 
variables.
From the firm's perspective, the VAT is a consumption tax levied at the point of 
sale, thus the base of the tax is company revenue. Willful evasion is measured at the firm 
level for each country through the WES/BEEPS surveys and is averaged based on the 
appropriate survey weights to obtain evasion at the national level.  Direct survey 
questions regarding evasion are not typically reliable as respondents do not want to 
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Variable Description Source
VAT Efficiency
C-Efficiency MV-B
Gross Collection Efficiency MV-B
Percentage of time dealing with government regulations WES
complexity WES
Percentage of sales reported for tax purposes WES
tax_inform If an informal payment to deal with taxes has been requested WES
audit_prod WES
Average number of tax meetings
Percentage of firms expected to give gifts to tax officials WDI
Percentage of firms that do not report all sales for tax purposes WDI
Time to prepare and pay taxes (Hours) WDI
corruption Corruption Perceptions Index Score
Natural log of population MV-B
Education Index MV-B
Share of population in urban area MV-B
VAT Experience MV-B
developed Developed Country MV-B
ve Martinez-Vasquez and Bird (MV-B)
ceff
gc
obst_taxreg Taxes are an obstacle to doing business (1-No Obstacle, 4-Major Obstacle)
World Enterprise 
Survey (WES)
law_govreg
Fitted values from Ordered Logit regression of obst_taxreg on 
law_govreg and controls
reprt_sales
Adjusted audit productivity (Number of times an audited firm is 
visited by tax authorities regressed on firm characteristics) 
taxmeet World Development Indicators (WDI)
taxbribe
taxevade
taxprep
Transparency 
International
lnpop
educind
urbanshare
exper
 implicate themselves in illegal activity.  Therefore, the pertinent question asks firms what 
percentage of sales the typical firm in their area reports for tax purposes.  By asking 
respondents in what level of evasion other firms engage, the responses are closer to actual 
values of evasion as the respondent's answer is informed by their own activities.  As with 
all variables taken from the WES/BEEPS surveys, this measure of evasion, reprt_sales, is 
aggregated to the country level for inclusion in the main tax gap model.   Average levels 
of evasion could be skewed by concentrated values, and not fully represent the levels of 
evasion in a country.  To account for this, the corresponding WDI variable measuring 
evasion, taxevade, is examined.  This is simply the percentage of firms that do not report 
all their sales for tax purposes.  While this variable does not measure the extent of 
evasion as reprt_sales does, it gives a measure of the pervasiveness of evasion which is 
not captured by reprt_sales and is not skewed by large or small levels of reporting. 
Unintentional evasion arising from complexity in the tax code will be estimated 
through a combination of two variables, the business's attitude toward the tax 
administration and the percentage of the firm's time spent on regulations.  Alone, neither 
of these variables can isolate the effect of complexity of the tax code.  The firm's attitude 
toward the tax administration, captured by asking the respondent if they find the tax 
administration as an obstacle to doing business, encompasses a number of factors, such as 
the firm's tax morale or the firm's previous experiences with the tax administration.  One 
factor contributing to the firm's perception that the tax administration is an obstacle to 
doing business could be the complexity of the tax code.
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 Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
More complex tax codes necessitate higher compliance costs and could lead to more 
acrimony between taxpayer and tax administration as businesses struggle to comply.  
These factors increase the perception of taxes as being an obstacle to business.  To 
separate the contribution of tax code complexity from the other factors affecting firm 
attitudes toward tax administration, the firm's perception of the tax administration is 
regressed on the firm's time spent on regulations.  
Isolating the effect of tax code complexity can be accomplished through the use of 
a two stage regression technique.  The variable containing the information of interest can 
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Variable        Obs Mean Min Max
        93 48.545 22.434 0.057 98.449
        87 59.651 24.586 0.083 115.976
        87 73.284 31.940 0.091 152.552
        78 1.372 0.430 0.251 2.558
        78 8.173 5.483 1.368 31.929
complexity         78 -0.976 0.696 -3.503 1.484
        78 78.859 16.528 32.565 97.031
tax_inform         78 25.360 21.807 0 84.974
audit_prod         78 -1.096 3.257 -5.494 20.184
        96 2.368 2.036 0.240 15.230
        96 26.866 22.961 0 84.520
        96 46.601 20.411 7.570 97.320
       103 385.029 276.370 76 2085
corruption        105 3.432 1.430 1.900 8.200
        98 13.917 1.325 10.789 18.525
        98 0.712 0.235 0.150 0.986
        99 0.530 0.204 0.098 0.921
        95 16.558 10.295 0 49
developed        108 0.111 0.316 0 1
Std. Dev.
ve
ceff
gc
obst_taxreg
law_govreg
reprt_sales
taxmeet
taxbribe
taxevade
taxprep
lnpop
educind
urbanshare
exper
 be written as x=e+ y where e is variation caused by the information of interest and y 
is the source variation caused by other factors.  An approach using a variable, z, that is 
correlated with e but not y in a first stage regression of x=δ z+ μ  results in 
x̂=δ̂ z ~ e .   The fitted values of x̂  contain only the information of interest as the 
confounding information, y, is contained in the error term of the first stage and is dropped 
when obtaining fitted values.
If all other influences on the firm's attitude toward tax administration are 
considered the “irrelevant” portion of the variable while the “relevant” portion is the 
effect of tax code complexity, then a variable that is correlated with tax code complexity 
but uncorrelated with the other factors can be used to isolate that effect.  
The percentage of time spent on regulations can be used as such a variable for 
complexity.  More complexity in the tax code implies not only a higher chance of 
mistakes, but also a greater deal of time spent on compliance.  Thus, firms dealing with a 
complex tax code will also report spending more time on regulations.  However, the 
firm's percentage of time dealing with regulations is not correlated with other factors, 
such as the tax rate faced, affecting the firm's attitudes.  Thus, this study uses a first stage 
regression of the form:
obst_admin = α+δ legal_reg+γX (2)
where obst_admin is the measure of the firm's perception of the tax administration as an 
obstacle to doing business, legal_reg is the firm's reported percentage of time spent on 
regulations and X is a vector of control variables that includes a variety of firm 
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 characteristics, and country and year fixed effects.  The fitted values of obst_admin, now 
stripped of all variation except for that arising from tax complexities, are aggregated and 
used in the main equation to measure the effect of unintentional evasion on the country's 
tax gap.
Two methods are used to estimate the tax code burden.  The main analysis 
estimates the first stage at the firm level, before aggregation.  The obst_admin variable is 
a Likert scale variable with values from 1, indicating taxes are not an obstacle to doing 
business, to 4, indicating taxes are a large obstacle.  To account for the nature of 
obst_admin, the main analysis first stage employs an ordered logit regression on 
legal_reg with a set of controls that includes the firm's level of sales, number of years in 
operation, legal organization type, ownership type, industry type, and country of 
operation.  The fitted values from this regression are propensity scores, giving the 
probability the firm finds taxes an obstacle to doing business.  Higher probabilities 
indicate a greater chance of the firm expressing greater antipathy toward taxes.  After 
estimation, each firm's fitted propensity score, denoted as the variable complexity, 
calculated and aggregated to the country level.  Not only does this allow instrumentation 
for obst_admin, but it also allows control of other firm characteristics that may affect 
attitudes toward taxes.
The second method is a standard two-stage least squares estimation.  First, 
obst_admin and legal_reg are aggregated to the country level.  Estimation then proceeds 
in the normal two-stage least square method, with obst_admin regressed on legal_reg and 
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 the other variables from the country level in the first stage and the fitted values of 
obst_admin used in the second stage.
Alternatively, the WDI variable used to measure tax code complexity is the 
average number of hours spent preparing and paying taxes.  As with the complexity 
variable, a larger number of hours preparing taxes can indicate a more complex tax code.
Corruption of the tax administration is determined by the number of firms that 
have been asked to engage in bribery of tax officials.  This variable, tax_inform, is a 
direct measure of tax administration corruption and therefore captures the effects of 
corrupt administrators on the tax gap.  Specifically, the WES/BEEP surveys ask if an 
informal payment has ever been requested in a meeting with tax officials.  The 
corresponding WDI measure is the percentage of firms expected to give gifts in meetings 
with tax officials.  An alternative measure, Transparency International's Corruption 
Perception Index, an aggregation of surveys and assessments used to gauge corruption 
perceptions, will also be used in additional specifications of the model to provide 
robustness checks and increase the power of the estimation.
Tax administration effectiveness is measured through the number of times firms 
are inspected during an audit for tax purposes.  Effective tax administrations staffed by 
capable agents will need a minimum number of inspections to adequately understand and 
assess a firm's tax situation. Correspondingly, more efficient tax administrations, with 
high quality record collection and keeping, do not need to inspect as many firms as less 
efficient administrations that must rely on on-site inspections to fill gaps in their 
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 information.  In addition to asking if the firm has been audited in the past year, the 
WES/BEEP surveys also ask the number of times a firm is visited by tax authorities 
during the audit.  
Using these two variables, an audit productivity measure can be constructed.  
Taking an audit as the output and the number of visits as an input, the audit productivity 
ratio is constructed as any other productivity ratio: the output divided by the input.  This 
measure captures the effectiveness of the tax authorities in extracting information from 
the firm.  If the authorities in a country collect the necessary information for tax 
enforcement in a single visit, then they can be considered more efficient than authorities 
from another country who need more than one visit to accomplish the same task.
However, this measure may not be fully comparable across countries.  If one 
country engages in audits of large companies with more complex financial situations, 
while another country heavily audits smaller, less complex firms, then the first country 
will have more visits per audit than the second, regardless of the relative efficiencies of 
the respective tax authorities.  Further, audit rates will also not be consistent across firm 
types within a country.  Should a firm be subject to a simple audit or bribe the auditor, the 
number of visits will be low giving an inflated audit productivity measure.
To derive a more accurate measure of efficiency, the raw efficiency must be 
adjusted by firm factors to reflect the technical efficiency of the authority.  By regressing 
the raw efficiency measure on firm characteristics and country fixed effects, the country 
specific technical audit efficiency can then be measured using the country specific 
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 intercepts.  A regression of the form:
AP i=βFC i+γ+ϵ             (3)
where AP is audit productivity as measured by the number of visits necessary to complete 
an audit for firm i, FC is a vector of firm i's characteristics and γ are country level fixed 
effects.  The country level fixed effects coefficients measure the unconditional mean audit 
productivity rate for each country independent of any firm characteristics that would 
otherwise affect audit efficiency. These country level mean audit efficiencies provide a 
proxy for other aspects of the tax administration's operations, such as funding levels or 
education levels of employees.
The WDI data offers a more general measure, unadjusted for country and firm 
differences.  Instead, the variable taxmeet simply measures the average number of times 
firms spend in meetings with tax officials.  This is essentially the same measure that 
underlies the WES/BEEP variable of audit efficiency, or the raw audit efficiency of the 
country.  
These four measures of tax evasion and tax administration are collected at the 
firm level and are aggregated to the country level.  The survey collection was specifically 
designed to gather a sample representative of the population.  In the case of evasion, 
complexity and corruption levels, a simple average of the variables will produce the 
appropriate economy wide average values.  For audit productivity, the country level fixed 
effects from regression (3) gives the appropriate economy wide values.  These values are 
then combined with the tax gap measures to form the main econometric specification of 
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 (1):
 Gi= α+β1WEi+β2UEi+β3Ci+β4Ai+ γX+ε (4)
where WE and UE are the averages of the appropriate fitted values from first stage 
regressions, C is the average number of firms engaged in bribery of tax officials, A is 
country i's adjusted audit efficiency, and X is a vector of control variables.  While these 
measures capture the variables of interest, they will not explain the entire tax gap Gi due 
to issues such as exemptions and zero ratings.  However, so long as these tax structure 
issues are orthogonal to these variables, these measures will give unbiased estimates.  
Though the WES/BEEPS surveys provide over 56,000 observations at the firm level, 
aggregation and gaps in the data result in only 60-130 observations depending on model 
specification.  As a result, to preserve the stability and power of the specification, the 
choice of control variables is somewhat limited.
While limited in number, the controls chosen each address some aspect of 
potential omitted variable bias.  An educational index is included to account for the 
taxpayer's general cognitive ability to ensure the effect captured by tax code complexity 
is not due to poorly educated taxpayers.  The educational index may also account for tax 
administration quality as lower educated tax collectors could result in reduced 
administration efficiency.  Likewise, the country's VAT experience, as measured by the 
number of years the country has had the VAT, ensures the audit efficiency measures the 
authority's competence and not their familiarity with the code.  A dummy variable for 
developed countries is included and controls for a variety of differences between country 
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 types.  Finally, the country's natural log of population and urban density are also 
included.
The expected sign for the willful evasion measure is actually negative since the 
survey response is the level of sales reported for tax purposes.  Lower reporting of sales 
reflects higher levels of tax evasion and thus a higher tax gap.  Unintentional evasion as 
measured by the complexity of the tax code will have an ambiguous effect as outlined 
above.  The level of corruption and increasing inefficiencies of the tax administration as 
measured by number of inspections necessary per firm are both expected to have positive 
effects on the tax gap.
The estimation of this specification gives the marginal contribution to the tax gap 
of each factor.  Country specific values of each independent variable will determine the 
actual share of the tax gap that can be attributed to that factor, and thus the appropriate 
policy response.  However, if the marginal contribution of a factor is negligible, then 
policy makers with the goal of minimizing the tax gap should not expend much effort on 
improving that factor.  For example, if tax code complexity is found to have no effect on 
the tax gap, perhaps because an increased base from more complexity cancels out the 
mistaken evasion, then policy makers would find more gains in reforming one of the 
other factors than in simplifying the tax code.
Results
Table 2.3 provides results from the first stage regressions isolating tax code 
burden and generating the country-specific unconditional audit probabilities.  The ordered 
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 logit first stage shows that time spent on government regulations is positively and 
significantly related to the firm's attitude toward taxes as an obstacle.   This result is 
consistent with a more complex tax code requiring more time and resources to complete 
and thus creating a greater antipathy toward taxes.   Additionally, a number of other 
controls, including the other variables used in the country level analysis, are significant. 
The second column of Table 2.3 details the audit productivity regression to isolate 
the country specific audit efficiency.  The results of this regression show that larger firms 
in both terms of employment (empfull) and sales (lnsales) require a greater number of 
visits, while all legal organization types need more audit visits than the excluded category 
of listed companies, which are typically required to publicly disclose financial 
information.  Once the firm characteristics of size, organizational structure, ownership, 
and industry are accounted, the remaining country fixed effects estimates (not reported 
for this table), reflect the technical audit efficiency of the tax authorities.
Table 2.4 reports the first stage results from regressions isolating the tax code 
burden using two stage least squares after aggregation to the country level.  The first 
column reports results without the control variables and the second with the controls. 
Like the ordered logit at the firm level, the number of hours spent on regulations is 
positively and significantly related to the average antipathy toward taxes.  However, the 
inclusion of the controls reduces the statistical significance of the effect to the 10% level.
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 Table 2.3: Firm Level First Stage Regressions
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Audit Adjustment
VARIABLES audit_prod
0.00967***
(0.00112)
-0.000132*** 0.000600**
(3.80e-05) (0.000266)
0.0304*** 0.229**
(0.00809) (0.0952)
0.000651 0.00424
(0.000876) (0.00417)
Closed Company 0.127 0.620**
(0.0884) (0.246)
Sole Proprietorship -0.00441 1.123**
(0.0938) (0.496)
Partnership 0.0126 0.663**
(0.0967) (0.312)
Public Sector 0.155 1.882**
(0.333) (0.718)
Other Legal Org. -0.0530 -0.469
(0.119) (0.518)
Domestic Private Ownership -0.0388 0.368
(0.0426) (0.403)
State Ownership -0.665** -0.617
(0.319) (0.487)
-0.00188***
(0.000553)
tax_inform 0.706***
(0.0354)
0.187***
(0.0455)
Cut 1 -1.464***
(0.268)
Cut 2 -0.449*
(0.268)
Cut 3 0.759***
(0.268)
Constant 0.362
(1.516)
Observations 41208 22386
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Ordered Logit
obst_taxreg
law_govreg
empfull
lnsales
yoper
reprt_sales
tax_inspec
 Table 2.4: Country Level First Stage Regressions
 
The signs of these variables does not change with the addition of control 
variables, as demonstrated by columns 4-6.  However, with the control variables, the 
significance of the variables changes slightly.  While evasion was a significant 
contributor to the tax gap in specifications with no controls, it loses significance with the 
addition of the controls.  Conversely, audit efficiency, a significant contributor to only the 
VAT Efficiency gap without controls, becomes significant for all tax gap measures with 
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VARIABLES
-0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.004)
tax_inform 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.003)
audit_prod21 0.011 0.012
(0.011) (0.014)
0.011
(0.040)
-0.350
(0.360)
-0.211
(0.365)
0.014***
(0.005)
developed -0.027
(0.194)
0.027*** 0.024*
(0.009) (0.012)
Constant 1.070*** 0.682
(0.197) (0.571)
Observations 64 62
R-squared 0.241 0.381
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
obst_taxreg obst_taxreg
reprt_sales
lnpop
educind
urbanshare
exper
law_govreg
 controls.  The coefficient for complexity, while reduced somewhat in magnitude from the 
non-control specifications, remains statistically significant at the 1% level whether 
controls are included or not.
Due to what the significant variables measure and how they are constructed from 
first stage estimates, interpretations of the marginal effects of the significant variables are 
difficult.  The measure of complexity is the nation's average probability of finding taxes 
an obstacle due to the amount of time spent on taxes.  Thus, a decrease in the probability 
of taxes being perceived as an obstacle to doing business arising from simplification of 
the tax code could result in reductions of 0.1 to 0.16 percentage points in the tax gap, 
depending on which measure is chosen.  Audit productivity is a more straightforward 
measure.  An increase in audit efficiency resulting in an average of one less visit per audit 
results in a reduction in the tax gap of between 1.09 and 1.26 percentage points.
The corresponding regressions with the WDI measures can be found in Table 2.6.  
Again, tax evasion and tax collector corruption are shown to increase the tax gap in every 
specification.  Similarly, a greater number of tax meetings also reduce collection 
efficiency.  The biggest difference between the two sets of measures comes from the tax 
complexity measure.  With the WDI measures, this variable loses all significance and 
changes sign in the new specifications.  
Though taxprep seems like a more straightforward measure of complexity than 
the one obtained from the WES data, this variable captures a number of different aspects 
of tax payment beyond tax code complexity.  For example, this measure does not 
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 distinguish between large and small companies.  Large companies will spend more time 
on taxes than smaller companies, despite facing the same level of tax code complexity. 
However, evidence suggests there are large economies of scale for tax compliance costs, 
making the compliance burden heavier for smaller firms (Hudson and Godwin 2000). 
Table 2.5: WES Data Results
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VARIABLES
complexity -10.100*** -13.147*** -18.652*** -9.743*** -11.627*** -16.017***
(2.670) (3.228) (4.337) (2.618) (2.846) (3.884)
0.351** 0.463*** 0.673*** 0.293 0.124 0.168
(0.134) (0.148) (0.178) (0.198) (0.207) (0.244)
tax_inform 0.037 -0.013 0.003 0.086 0.079 0.102
(0.124) (0.132) (0.164) (0.128) (0.133) (0.167)
audit_prod21 -0.806** -0.586* -0.588 -1.086** -1.094** -1.255**
(0.374) (0.326) (0.396) (0.528) (0.515) (0.614)
-4.344** -5.014** -6.173**
(1.825) (2.143) (2.720)
13.937 22.217 31.029
(14.603) (15.858) (21.340)
10.842 30.787 38.766
(20.383) (22.135) (29.805)
0.141 0.211 0.188
(0.276) (0.331) (0.452)
developed -9.080 -5.034 0.739
(7.361) (10.059) (14.145)
Constant 31.741*** 37.428*** 40.156*** 76.627** 93.722*** 113.378***
(11.121) (11.671) (13.854) (28.765) (32.811) (39.922)
Observations 67 64 64 65 62 62
R-squared 0.248 0.293 0.335 0.350 0.461 0.490
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ve ceff gc ve ceff gc
reprt_sales
lnpop
educind
urbanshare
exper
 The effect of larger firms, which tend to pay taxes, spending a large number of hours on 
tax preparation and smaller firms facing a higher compliance burden but spending less 
time on taxes, could result in the positive, though insignificant, relationship between tax 
preparation time and reported sales.  As a result, this swing in results should 
be interpreted with care.
The significance of measures also changes somewhat from the WES regressions 
in the controlled regressions.  While tax code complexity is no longer significant, tax 
authority corruption is now significant at the 5% level for two of the three tax efficiency 
measures.  Tax administration efficiency is still significant, with the WDI measure 
significant at the 10% level for the C-efficiency and gross collection efficiency measures.
Magnitudes for these variables are similar to those of the WES variables.  A one 
percentage point reduction in the number of firms being asked for bribe payments 
increases collection efficiency by 0.23 to 0.31 percentage points.  On average, one more 
meeting with tax officials corresponds with a decrease of 2.09 to 2.69 percentage points 
in collection efficiency.
To further explore the role of corruption in tax collection, Tables 7 and 8 detail the 
same specifications but with Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 
in lieu of the WES and WDI measures of tax official corruption.  This broader measure of 
corruption, while less precise with respect to tax payment, provides a robustness check 
for the previous specifications.  The substitution of the corruption index for the tax 
corruption measures does not greatly affect point estimates for the other variables.
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 Table 2.6: WDI Data Results
  
The WES variables of complexity and audit_prod, reported in Table 2.7, continue 
to show the same magnitudes and significance as in earlier specifications.  Moreover, for 
the VAT efficiency, tax evasion also becomes significant at the 10% level.  This suggests 
a relationship between tax evasion and tax administration corruption.  Any specific 
effects of collusion between cheating firms and corrupt tax officials are split between the 
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VARIABLES
-0.007 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.010 0.018
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012)
-0.205 -0.264* -0.399** -0.049 -0.024 -0.059
(0.132) (0.146) (0.185) (0.114) (0.120) (0.144)
-0.134 -0.200* -0.235 -0.157 -0.225* -0.306*
(0.107) (0.116) (0.146) (0.115) (0.123) (0.155)
-1.383 -1.961** -2.634** -1.771 -2.089 -2.691*
(0.934) (0.894) (1.177) (1.417) (1.289) (1.528)
-4.955*** -4.616** -6.252**
(1.618) (2.021) (2.553)
27.097* 33.240** 44.943**
(14.422) (14.755) (18.072)
12.319 20.743 24.848
(19.991) (20.067) (24.964)
-0.398* -0.382* -0.611**
(0.227) (0.223) (0.287)
developed -2.601 4.604 13.477
(6.431) (7.785) (10.294)
Constant 68.550*** 81.291*** 102.215*** 109.262*** 103.028*** 133.748***
(8.236) (9.179) (11.763) (24.977) (32.384) (40.176)
Observations 83 79 79 81 77 77
R-squared 0.097 0.130 0.143 0.368 0.412 0.455
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ve ceff gc ve ceff gc
taxprep
taxevade
taxbribe
taxmeet
lnpop
educind
urbanshare
exper
 two measures in earlier specifications.  With the broader measure of corruption, these 
specific effects are accounted for by the tax evasion measure alone.  
The broader measure of corruption is significant at the 5% level for all three 
measures of collection efficiency when estimated with the WES variables.  A one point 
increase in corruption perceptions, indicating a decrease in corruption in the society, 
results in a 3.52 to 5.97 percentage point increase in collection efficiencies.  However, 
when paired with the WDI data, the corruption index is not a significant determinant of 
the tax gap.  For these regressions, reported in Table 2.8, the only variable that remains 
significant is taxmeet, the measure of tax official's efficiency.  This remains negative at 
the same magnitude as other specifications.
Table 2.9 reports results of the second approach to isolate the complexity of the 
tax code from the two WES variables obst_taxreg and law_govreg.  This approach 
involved aggregating the two WES variables to the country level, then following a 2SLS 
approach to isolate complexity from the firm's attitudes.  In this approach, signs and 
magnitudes of the other three variables of interest remain similar to previous 
specifications.  However, this measure of complexity generates much larger estimates (in 
absolute values) than firm level estimation of complexity.  
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 Table 2.7: WES Data Results with Corruption Perceptions Index
This alternative estimation also changes several variables' statistical significance.  
Only audit productivity is significant for the VAT efficiency estimation. Further, the 
statistical significance for obst_taxreg is diminished, only reaching the 10% significance 
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VARIABLES
complexity -10.742*** -13.339*** -18.468*** -10.130*** -12.370*** -17.086***
(2.536) (3.210) (4.515) (2.431) (2.628) (3.629)
0.400*** 0.465*** 0.660*** 0.347 0.160 0.208
(0.148) (0.157) (0.190) (0.212) (0.209) (0.250)
corruption -1.880 -0.285 0.215 -3.521* -4.472** -5.973**
(1.840) (2.071) (2.652) (1.893) (1.979) (2.524)
audit_prod21 -0.809* -0.591 -0.520 -1.284** -1.402** -1.612**
(0.432) (0.396) (0.488) (0.599) (0.575) (0.701)
-5.247** -6.122** -7.423**
(2.103) (2.344) (2.969)
12.167 21.485 30.610
(14.984) (15.583) (21.400)
18.963 43.552* 54.893*
(20.228) (21.862) (29.252)
0.100 0.166 0.144
(0.267) (0.303) (0.414)
developed -1.468 5.281 14.522
(7.061) (9.459) (13.737)
Constant 36.161*** 38.166*** 40.119** 96.975*** 118.633*** 143.791***
(11.171) (12.460) (15.160) (33.568) (36.300) (45.140)
Observations 65 63 63 63 61 61
R-squared 0.251 0.288 0.330 0.360 0.490 0.518
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ve ceff gc ve ceff gc
reprt_sales
lnpop
educind
urbanshare
exper
 Table 2.8: WDI Data Results with Corruption Perception Index
 
level for two of the three specifications.  This is likely due to the weak correlation 
between obst_taxreg and law_govreg in the first stage with included controls.  Under this 
approach, reducing the probability of antipathy toward taxes by simplifying them leads to 
an increase in collection efficiency of between 0.4 and 0.5 percentage points.  While 
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VARIABLES
-0.008 0.004 0.010 -0.001 0.007 0.014
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
-0.168 -0.208 -0.298 -0.073 -0.061 -0.100
(0.152) (0.172) (0.215) (0.126) (0.136) (0.166)
corruption 1.195 3.083 5.270* -1.635 -0.449 0.165
(2.059) (2.316) (2.982) (1.796) (1.950) (2.448)
-1.456 -1.962** -2.391** -2.519* -2.855** -3.598**
(0.932) (0.897) (1.156) (1.319) (1.180) (1.433)
-5.889*** -5.428** -7.189***
(1.779) (2.122) (2.663)
14.916 19.619 27.299*
(13.020) (12.999) (15.961)
26.002 34.781* 41.894*
(18.884) (19.745) (24.645)
-0.347 -0.265 -0.440
(0.233) (0.241) (0.311)
developed 0.104 4.197 11.412
(5.942) (7.782) (10.390)
Constant 59.361*** 61.979*** 70.621*** 128.792*** 115.545*** 144.946***
(14.598) (16.291) (20.572) (29.470) (36.209) (45.316)
Observations 81 78 78 79 76 76
R-squared 0.074 0.118 0.153 0.352 0.384 0.422
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ve ceff gc ve ceff gc
taxprep
taxevade
taxmeet
lnpop
educind
urbanshare
exper
 these results buttress earlier results, the larger sample size at the firm level make the prior 
estimates preferable.
Table 2.9: WES Data Results with 2SLS for obst_taxreg
Tables 2.10 and 2.11 repeat the analysis from Tables 5 and 6, but include year 
fixed effects as well.  The WES specifications again show complexity as a statistically 
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VARIABLES
-19.962 -33.486 -52.259 -30.605 -42.055* -56.706*
(23.038) (29.633) (37.403) (21.204) (24.343) (30.095)
0.332** 0.471*** 0.679*** 0.238 0.199 0.265
(0.168) (0.166) (0.205) (0.174) (0.219) (0.270)
tax_inform 0.088 0.096 0.188 0.234 0.289 0.381
(0.223) (0.267) (0.340) (0.243) (0.262) (0.327)
audit_prod21 -0.957*** -0.741** -0.790** -1.147** -1.084** -1.249**
(0.354) (0.289) (0.344) (0.453) (0.452) (0.565)
-4.061** -4.084* -4.916*
(1.784) (2.195) (2.854)
12.575 16.172 23.148
(14.046) (18.214) (25.121)
9.233 27.249 34.144
(20.534) (23.421) (32.013)
0.329 0.543 0.624
(0.451) (0.536) (0.711)
developed -11.056 -7.930 -3.005
(8.217) (11.291) (15.601)
Constant 48.672 65.965 86.849* 104.346** 116.198*** 143.531***
(36.925) (42.060) (52.529) (41.636) (39.802) (48.731)
Observations 67 64 64 65 62 62
R-squared 0.232 0.225 0.225 0.264 0.300 0.323
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ve ceff gc ve ceff gc
obst_taxreg
reprt_sales
lnpop
educind
urbanshare
exper
 important determinant of the tax gap, while audit productivity also remains significant for 
c-efficiency and general collection efficiency in the fully controlled model.  The WDI 
specifications also show results comparable with previous specifications, though tax 
administration factors are generally statistically significant, while tax payer factors are 
not. 
In a majority of the estimation sets without controls, the measure of tax evasion is 
statistically significant.  However, with the inclusion of control variables, this 
significance disappears.  Specifically, the inclusion of the educational index is the 
primary driver behind this change.  Though this measure of education may encompass a 
number of effects, this result suggests a strong negative correlation between education 
levels and tax evasion.  As societies become more educated, tax evasion seems to fall.  
This could be due to increasing costs to illicit activities as education becomes more 
prevalent.  Educated taxpayers are able to earn more legitimately and have more to lose if 
caught evading taxes.  Study of this relationship could prove a fruitful avenue for future 
research.
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 Table 2.10: WES Data Results with Year Fixed Effecs
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VARIABLES
complexity -5.773* -8.700** -13.052** -1.876 -4.976 -8.209*
(2.930) (3.640) (5.182) (2.859) (3.344) (4.840)
0.106 0.235 0.343 -0.095 -0.158 -0.165
(0.159) (0.182) (0.225) (0.181) (0.211) (0.266)
tax_inform -0.200 -0.299* -0.390* -0.281** -0.251* -0.307*
(0.145) (0.168) (0.219) (0.123) (0.131) (0.165)
audit_prod21 -0.171 0.152 0.176 -0.429 -0.671 -0.802
(0.450) (0.568) (0.715) (0.476) (0.565) (0.738)
Year 2004 27.503** 62.540***
(13.174) (13.513)
Year 2005 32.389*** 8.112 9.844 45.683*** -2.099 3.219
(9.683) (13.475) (16.027) (7.840) (14.619) (20.129)
Year 2006 20.629** -5.016 -9.882 27.785*** -20.896 -21.062
(8.663) (15.206) (18.181) (8.164) (16.455) (22.018)
Year 2007 28.423** -2.028 -9.096 51.336*** 0.462 1.982
(10.792) (14.903) (18.109) (10.317) (17.581) (25.162)
Year 2008 -29.119 -37.936* -41.757** -46.259**
(18.125) (21.725) (16.282) (21.717)
Year 2009 12.156 -18.048 -25.959 23.732* -24.551 -25.185
(15.528) (22.932) (27.335) (12.615) (19.378) (24.752)
-6.914*** -6.902*** -8.292***
(1.663) (2.081) (2.795)
30.389 31.289 37.865
(18.654) (21.739) (30.172)
-1.205 22.698 31.589
(18.648) (22.749) (31.572)
0.103 0.219 0.197
(0.276) (0.330) (0.450)
developed -18.726** -11.222 -5.902
(8.286) (11.750) (17.442)
Constant 27.886** 59.110*** 73.848*** 102.894*** 153.035*** 179.798***
(10.973) (22.137) (26.625) (25.684) (39.468) (51.418)
Observations 67 64 64 65 62 62
R-squared 0.324 0.371 0.418 0.519 0.562 0.578
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ve ceff gc ve ceff gc
reprt_sales
lnpop
educind
urbanshare
exper
 Table 2.11: WDI Data Results with Year Fixed Effects
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VARIABLES
-0.009 0.003 0.007 -0.001 0.008 0.016
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012)
-0.135 -0.156 -0.251 0.003 0.065 0.038
(0.131) (0.139) (0.180) (0.111) (0.110) (0.141)
-0.326*** -0.456*** -0.607*** -0.170 -0.269** -0.386**
(0.111) (0.125) (0.161) (0.108) (0.114) (0.150)
-0.612 -1.042 -1.253 -1.967 -2.204* -2.730*
(1.144) (1.224) (1.490) (1.392) (1.276) (1.518)
Year 2005 7.923 17.003*** 31.718*** 2.316 -21.167** -17.227
(5.824) (6.415) (8.552) (13.053) (8.026) (10.445)
Year 2006 -8.453 -5.549 -0.257 -3.548 -29.953*** -30.223***
(6.087) (6.524) (8.113) (11.208) (6.519) (8.348)
Year 2007 0.662 6.610 13.035 14.934 -6.116 -2.792
(6.587) (5.784) (8.086) (11.487) (4.397) (6.288)
Year 2008 25.046**
(11.246)
Year 2009 -11.094 -6.400 -1.579 -27.969** -27.864
(13.504) (17.231) (20.820) (13.852) (16.818)
-6.021*** -5.619** -7.244**
(1.732) (2.277) (2.891)
29.179* 35.897** 44.707**
(15.267) (16.719) (21.248)
14.429 25.607 30.928
(19.382) (19.305) (24.371)
-0.343 -0.344 -0.561*
(0.243) (0.241) (0.309)
developed -4.059 2.422 9.904
(6.483) (7.496) (10.220)
Constant 69.655*** 75.320*** 86.788*** 118.466*** 132.839*** 163.240***
(8.906) (9.438) (11.957) (25.593) (36.962) (46.543)
Observations 83 79 79 81 77 77
R-squared 0.178 0.254 0.290 0.440 0.504 0.528
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ve ceff gc ve ceff gc
taxprep
taxevade
taxbribe
taxmeet
lnpop
educind
urbanshare
exper
 Discussion
These results suggest a number of avenues by which authorities can address the 
tax gap.  An important trend in tax reform has been a shift from an enforcement paradigm 
to a service paradigm.  The enforcement paradigm places emphasis on the criminal 
aspects of tax evasion, represented in this analysis by the willful tax evasion measure.  
This emphasis assumes the tax gap is primarily driven by evasive behavior and addresses 
the gap through increased enforcement measures and stiffer penalties for evasion.
However, the models underlying this paradigm, first proposed by Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972), do not adequately account for the levels of compliance seen in reality.  
As a result, a large body of literature has developed focusing fully explaining tax 
compliance.  One result of this line of inquiry is the growing importance of a service 
paradigm for tax authorities (Alm and Martinez-Vazquez 2003).  Under the service 
paradigm tax authorities focus on helping the taxpayer accurately file their taxes by 
providing information and other services when needed.  Though studies focusing on these 
changes in tax administration are still sparse, early results suggest that the service 
paradigm does increase compliance (Alm, Cherry, Jones and McKee 2010).
The results from this analysis seem to support a service paradigm for tax 
authorities as well.  The distinction between enforcement and service paradigms directly 
suggests the two types of evasion identified for this analysis.  Willful evasion is a 
proactive undertaking in which the taxpayer purposefully does not pay taxes.  No amount 
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 of tax preparation help from tax authorities will affect the willful evader's decisions.  
Only the threat of discovery and punishment will deter this evasion, therefore an 
enforcement paradigm is appropriate.  
However, the enforcement paradigm does little to deter unintentional evasion.  
Unintentional evaders intend to comply with the tax code, but are unable because of tax 
code uncertainty and complexity.  A service oriented tax administration mitigates the 
difficulties arising from that complexity, thereby increasing compliance rates.
Generally when tax evasion is addressed, the distinction between willful and 
unintentional evasion is not made.  All failures to pay taxes are considered to be evasion, 
with no consideration of the motivations or difficulties behind those failures.  By 
distinguishing these two types of evasion, this analysis gives some evidence as to why the 
service paradigm has enjoyed so much prominence in recent tax administration reforms.  
In terms of individual's compliance, the main driver of the tax gap is the unintentional 
evasion that the service paradigm is designed to address.  These results suggest that 
greater gains in tax compliance are to be made focusing on making it easier for taxpayers 
to pay taxes.
In addition to establishing more helpful tax administrations, this analysis suggests 
tax code simplification could also reduce the tax gap.  Compliance costs, encompassing 
time and resources necessary to prepare and pay taxes, can be substantial, particularly for 
small firms when the VAT is considered.  This analysis suggests that reducing complexity 
and the corresponding compliance costs will not only lighten the load on firms, but also 
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 result in happier, and thus more willing, taxpayers.  With reduced compliance costs, firms 
have the necessary capacity to fully comply, and the tax gap shrinks correspondingly.
  Simplifying and streamlining the tax paying process addresses shortcomings in 
revenue due to taxpayer factors.  Equally important is adequately funding and staffing the 
tax authorities.  The arguments for the importance of good tax administration are well 
developed. (Bird and Gendron 2007).  Even with the “self-enforcing” features of the VAT, 
the need for highly skilled and honest tax officials is evident (Bird 2004). Further, the 
success of either the service or enforcement paradigm in increasing overall compliance 
depends on having capable tax authorities furnished with the necessary tools to complete 
their jobs.  Even the best designed tax system can be rendered irrelevant if it is not 
implemented properly. 
Though the arguments for good tax administration cover a range of issues, this 
analysis focuses only on the role of tax administration in increasing tax revenues.  
Competent tax authorities are able to quickly identify and collect taxes that are due.  This 
analysis shows that as competence declines, as measured by the number of visits needed 
to perform an audit, the tax gap increases.  While a broad measure of tax administration 
quality, this result gives some empirical evidence for the importance of high quality tax 
administration.
Further, the results of this analysis show that corruption is detrimental to revenue 
collection.  Good governance is widely recognized to be essential to a number of positive 
economic outcomes  (Jenkins 1992).  Corruption at the level of the tax official, as 
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 indicated by firms expected to give tax bribes, is shown to reduce tax collections.  
Additionally, society wide corruption levels are also shown to have implications for the 
tax gap.  While the corruption perception index is a countrywide measure, it is reasonable 
to expect the level of corruption to trickle down to the tax administration, particularly if 
corruption has been established as a societal norm.  
While this study provides evidence for the determinants of the tax gap, the results 
are not conclusive.  Though the base, firm-level data from which the measures are 
derived is large, the aggregation to the country level greatly reduces sample size.  The 
necessary reliance of these types of macro-level studies on such small cross-sectional 
samples can be problematic and necessary consideration is needed in drawing 
conclusions.  Additionally, the firm level data on which these measures are based are 
subject to reporting biases, particularly due to the sensitive nature of the topic.  While this 
is an important issue, the lack of higher quality data forces compromise.
Conclusion
Tax revenue shortfall is a significant problem, particularly for developing 
countries.  Without adequate tax revenues, governments can not provide the necessary 
public services to foster growth.  Further, shortfalls push governments to levy ever more 
distortionary taxes in attempts to raise funds.  These additional taxes places an undue 
burden on economies, and likely hinder growth.
Though the tax gap is an important policy issue, little empirical work has focused 
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 on determining what drives the gap.  The general approach in previous literature 
attributes the tax gap to some combination of tax evasion and tax administration/design.  
However, this approach does not distinguish between types of evasion or administration 
issues.  When undertaking tax reforms, governments must be aware of the source of 
revenue shortfall in order to enact appropriate reforms that will address that shortfall.
This study identifies four potential causes of the tax gap, each with different 
policy implications.  Two causes arise from the taxpayer.  Unintentional evasion, arising 
from complexities in the tax code, should be addressed through measures such as tax 
code simplification and taxpayer education.  Willful evasion, a criminal behavior, 
requires tougher penalties for evasion and better enforcement of the laws.  Similarly, tax 
administration have analogous causes.  Administration issues arising from inadequate 
resources devoted to collecting taxes can be solved by adequately funding and staffing 
the tax authority.  Corruption of the tax authorities, the final cause, requires its own 
solutions.
This study gives some insight into which causes are the primary factors driving 
the tax gap.  Firm-level data collected from a variety of countries shows the most 
significant drivers of the tax gap are unintentional evasion and poor tax administration, 
followed by tax administration corruption.  As such, the most effective reforms to 
increase tax revenue will focus on establishing a competent, service oriented tax 
administration that enables taxpayers to comply with the law instead of just punishing 
them after they've unwittingly broken the law.
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 Table 2.12: Correlation Coefficients for All Variables
61
complexity tax_inform
1.0000
0.2145 1.0000
complexity 0.9563 0.3399 1.0000
0.0543 -0.0179 0.0417 1.0000
tax_inform 0.3861 -0.3210 0.3055 0.1695 1.0000
audit_prod21 0.0319 -0.2460 0.0049 0.2754 0.6194
0.1478 -0.1073 0.1163 -0.0710 0.5443
0.3605 -0.2880 0.2886 0.2152 0.9897
0.1339 0.0447 0.1216 -0.8497 0.0087
0.1150 0.1428 0.0995 0.1309 0.1101
corruption -0.3484 -0.1384 -0.3291 0.2262 -0.4735
0.1716 0.1957 0.1218 -0.0779 -0.0442
-0.0616 -0.0539 -0.1065 0.6037 0.1317
-0.0762 0.1658 -0.0917 0.3222 -0.1732
0.2312 0.2603 0.2331 0.0084 -0.3155
developed -0.0829 -0.2755 -0.1267 0.2698 -0.0681
audit_prod21
audit_prod21 1.0000
0.6653 1.0000
0.6098 0.5400 1.0000
-0.1311 0.1600 -0.0393 1.0000
0.1819 0.1067 0.1328 -0.1652 1.0000
corruption -0.2131 -0.3666 -0.4559 -0.2219 -0.1945
-0.1030 -0.0379 -0.0682 0.0825 0.2111
0.3250 -0.0734 0.1683 -0.4688 0.2217
0.0615 -0.1999 -0.1610 -0.2993 0.2841
-0.1958 -0.2542 -0.3433 -0.0224 0.2045
developed -0.0149 -0.2456 -0.0744 -0.1900 -0.0260
corruption
corruption 1.0000
-0.2056 1.0000
0.3334 -0.1214 1.0000
0.4335 0.0516 0.6845 1.0000
0.1769 0.1801 0.0876 0.3491 1.0000
developed 0.5272 -0.1069 0.2311 0.0662 0.1791
obst_taxreg law_govreg reprt_sales
obst_taxreg
law_govreg
reprt_sales
taxmeet
taxbribe
taxevade
taxprep
lnpop
educind
urbanshare
exper
taxmeet taxbribe taxevade taxprep
taxmeet
taxbribe
taxevade
taxprep
lnpop
educind
urbanshare
exper
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 Chapter 3: Macroeconomic Effects of VAT Evasion and Enforcement
Introduction
Tax evasion is often considered a significant problem in most countries and 
significant resources may be spent trying to address this problem.  This view of tax 
evasion stems from a focus on shortfalls in government revenues resulting from tax 
evasion, and the resulting inability of governments to fund public goods and services, 
which may contribute to economic growth.  However, this is not the only perspective 
with which to approach evasion.  An alternative view to focusing on revenue shortfall is 
to consider the direct effects of evasion on economic growth.  Should evasion create a 
drag on economic growth, then the resources used to deal with evasion may be well 
spent.  However, if evasion results in greater economic growth, then a more benign 
attitude toward evasion may be warranted. This could be possible if, for example, evasion 
were to leave more resources in the private sector for investment that otherwise could be 
wasted, via corruption or inefficiency, in the public sector.1
Theoretically, the effects of evasion on growth are mixed.  With respect to savings 
and capital accumulation, tax evasion increases disposable income.  A portion of this 
income is then saved, increasing the economy's capital stock and thereby driving higher 
economic growth.  Alternatively, the evaded funds could be invested abroad, reducing the 
economy's capital stock.  
1  Public resources from taxation may also be used simply for public consumption without any direct 
implications for economic growth. That will depend on the type of public consumption.; for example 
retirement benefits vis-à-vis education 
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 Higher evasion also results in lower government revenue.  Lower revenue places 
greater constraints on government spending on public goods and infrastructure.  If 
spending on public goods is sub-optimal due to this constraint, economic growth will 
suffer accordingly.  The resulting lower revenue may induce the government to raise tax 
rates or increase resources devoted to enforcement to increase revenue levels.  Higher tax 
rates will create more distortions in the economy and higher resource allocation to 
enforcement reduces resources available for more productive purposes.  Both actions will 
have the effect of reducing economic growth.
In addition to the effects on government revenues and public finance, tax evasion 
also has an associated excess burden which reduces welfare (Martinez-Vazquez 1993).  
One source of excess burden are “anxiety costs” stemming from the gamble the tax 
evader takes when hiding income.  Additionally, evasion could result in misallocation of 
resources as the illicit revenues are shifted even less efficient activities in the 
underground sector or the government closes its revenue gap without raising taxes.  
Evasion also imposes an externality on non-evading taxpayers as they must compensate 
for the lost revenue from their own income. 
The difference between anticipated tax revenue and actual tax revenue, the tax 
gap, can be quite significant, particularly for developing economies.  For example, at $4.8 
billion, Pakistan's tax gap for all federal taxes was over 30% of potential revenue in 2005  
(Ahmed and Rider 2008).  Contrasted with total Pakistani FDI in 2004-2005 of $1.5 
billion (Azam and Rehman, 2009), it becomes clear that, particularly in developing 
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 economies, the revenue lost to tax evasion can be quite significant.   Developed countries 
can be little better off, with OECD tax gaps ranging from 4%-17.5% (Slemrod, 2007).  
While the question of public expenditures' effect on growth has not been fully settled, a 
number of empirical studies have found positive effects (Cashin 1995, Clements, 
Bhattacharya and Nguyen 2003, Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou 1996, Gupta, Clements, 
Baldacci and Mulas-Granados 2005).
While examining the effect of evasion on economic growth is important, from a 
policy perspective, governments have limited control over a firm's actual decision to 
evade taxes on income the taxpayer is responsible for reporting.  Instead, the level of tax 
evasion an individual chooses to engage in is based on a number of factors, some of 
which are controlled by the government.  Compliance factors like the audit rate and 
penalties levied on evaders are set by the government and influence evasion rates.  A 
wide body of literature has demonstrated the response of evasion rates to these factors 
(Alm 2012, Alm and Jacobson 2007).  The changes in evasion rates resulting from 
changes in these compliance factors will then translate into changes in economic growth. 
 If a government's goal is to maximize economic growth, it is important for policy 
makers to understand how the decisions they make in setting compliance factors will 
affect growth.  In understanding these effects, policy makers can make better informed 
decisions regarding compliance factors and any potential tradeoffs with economic 
growth.  By understanding this tradeoff, the government can understand if it suffers from 
a principle-agent problem with the tax collection authority.  
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 For example, while increasing the audit rate may result in higher tax collections, 
and thus suit the tax authorities of getting the most revenue possible, if higher audit rates 
result in lower economic growth, policy makers may wish to forgo higher collections the 
higher audit rates bring.  Alternatively, if the proceeds of evasion are not being put to 
productive use by the private sector, but instead being consumed or shifted abroad, the 
government can chose to increase collection efforts in an attempt to use that revenue for 
more productive public good uses.
Despite the potential impacts of tax enforcement on growth, little empirical work 
has focused on it.  This study presents two analysis to examine the effect of tax 
enforcement and tax revenue shortfall in general on economic growth.  The first uses firm 
level data to generate measures of audit rates and corruption in the tax administration, 
which are then applied in a cross-sectional analysis of enforcement measures.  The 
second uses tax collection efficiencies at the country level to extend the first analysis to a 
panel setting.  The ensuing results are consistent with a theoretical endogenous growth 
model of tax evasion and enforcement, suggesting that while some direct effects of lax 
enforcement can be beneficial, the overall effect of lower tax revenue is detrimental to 
growth.
Literature Review 
A well developed body of literature has been developed on optimal tax 
enforcement.  Early theoretical work by Allingham and Sandmo (1972)  uses the rational 
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 crime framework of tax evasion subject and government budget constraints to derive 
optimal enforcement levels.  Allingham and Sandmo's solution sets the optimal 
enforcement parameters where the “marginal cost [is] greater than marginal tax revenue”, 
a result that gives greater enforcement than the traditional cost benefit analysis.  
Following this result and using a similar welfare maximization model as Sandmo, 
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987) develop a theoretical result which yields an optimal level of 
enforcement equal to the savings in excess burden from reducing evasion.  In this model, 
the excess burden arises from the uncertainty associated with evasion gamble and 
increasing the probability of detection serves to reduce this excess burden as it reduces 
uncertainty.  Thus optimal tax enforcement levels occur where the marginal cost of 
additional enforcement is equal to the marginal reduction in excess burden obtained from 
making the evasion gamble more certain. The level of revenue generated from the 
increased enforcement does not enter into this optimality decision because the model 
views it as a simple transfer between agents.  However, this model only gives a partial 
equilibrium answer as the revenue gained is not limited to being just a transfer, but can be 
used productively as investments or public goods.
Mayshar (1991) emphasizes tax administration “technology” in a generalized 
framework to examine the optimal tax administration efforts and shows that the social 
costs of increasing enforcement to increase revenue may outweigh the social costs of 
increasing tax rates.  Similarly, Kaplow (1990) and Cremer and Gahvari (1993) introduce 
tax administration and enforcement in a commodity tax setting, showing there is a 
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 tradeoff between the tax rate and enforcement measures and the optimal tax often 
depends on the presence of evasion and enforcement costs.  These models have been 
extended to include income taxes with heterogenous individuals in terms of income and 
enforcement rules, resulting in implications for tax progressivity (Cremer and Gahvari 
1994, Cremer and Gahvari 1996).  Other work has introduced different tax bases and 
penalty structures as well  (Borck 2004, Richter and Boadway 2005).  This line of 
literature focuses on the appropriate balance between using tax enforcement measures 
versus other methods, such as higher rates or broader bases, to raise revenue.  
Chander and Wilde (1998) approach the problem of income taxation enforcement 
with a principle-agent framework.  Drawing Mirrlees' (1971) optimal tax policy work, the 
theoretical question the authors investigate is how progressive taxation should be.  In 
terms of tax enforcement, this model gives a regressive result for optimal audit 
probabilities; audit costs (and thus probabilities) are low only when high income 
taxpayers pay less than low income tax payers.
While this branch of the literature relies on a traditional approach of setting the 
level of tax enforcement as an optimization problem, other studies have examined the 
optimal methods of enforcement.  Graetz, et al. (1986) and Sansing (1993)  allow for 
interaction between taxpayer and tax enforcement officials.  Meanwhile, Alm, and Mckee 
(2004) use an experimental setup to show that, while the tax authority can effectively use 
information from taxpayers due to coordination failures between the payers, switching 
between audit rules can increase enforcement.  Additionally, when tax payer 
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 characteristics are known to the tax authority, they can be incorporated into the audit 
decision, yielding more efficient monitoring strategies (Bigio and Zilberman 2011).
The significant body of work on optimal tax enforcement focuses on increasing 
compliance rates in light of costs associated with the necessary audits to do so.  In this 
respect, the literature focuses on a partial equilibrium framework and what action is 
optimal for the taxpayer and tax collector with the goals of maximizing utility and 
collections respectively.  Little attention has been paid to how these optimality decisions 
affect economic growth in a dynamic setting.
Efforts to study economic growth also have deep roots.  Endogenous growth 
models began appearing in the 1980s to account for economic growth with choices made 
inside the economy (Romer 1994).  Instead of growth being the result of some exogenous 
change from outside forces, this line of inquiry focuses on public and private choices that 
cause growth to fluctuate.  A number of different factors have been examined, including 
the effect of taxes and government spending on growth  (Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller 
2001, Cashin 1995, Johansson, Heady, Arnold, Brys and Vartia 2008).  However, while 
some theoretical work addressing tax evasion has been developed, almost no empirical 
work has been conducted testing the impact of tax evasion on economic growth.  The few 
empirical studies that do exist tend to focus on single countries or employ crude methods. 
The effects of tax evasion and compliance measures on growth have been the 
subject of several theoretical studies.  Caballé and Panadés (1997) introduce an 
overlapping generations model incorporating the rational crime framework that 
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 characterizes the partial equilibrium work on tax evasion.  Focusing on compliance 
policy, this study finds the audit and fine rates have ambiguous effects on growth.  These 
effects depend on the relative productivity between public and private capital.  In 
scenarios in which private capital is more productive, increases in compliance measures 
will reduce growth, while when public capital is more productive, increased compliance 
will increase growth.
In contrast, Gahramamov (2009) employs an overlapping generation model with 
small enforcement parameters, particularly a low fine rate.  As with other theoretical 
models, the result is an increase in evasion and capital accumulation.  However, in this 
model, capital accumulation exceeds the golden rule level, resulting in a sub-optimal 
growth path.  In this respect, increasing enforcement to reduce savings results in more 
balanced growth.  
Also using an overlapping generations model, Wrede (1995) emphasizes 
productive public resources in the relationship between evasion and growth.  In cases in 
which public spending is productive and adds to the capital stock, evasion will reduce the 
long run growth rate.  However, when government spending is consumptive in nature, the 
effects of evasion become ambiguous, depending on the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution.
Approaching the problem using stochastic optimal control, Eichhorn (2004) gives 
similar results.  Finding households increase savings, which in turn boost economic 
growth, when engaging in tax evasion, this study conforms with other theoretical work.  
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 However, this model assumes a purely consumptive public good, thus under-provision 
has no effect on the growth rate.  Further, the government can adjust the tax policy to 
compensate, thus creating a neutral result on economic growth.
Lin and Yan (2001), adopting a similar assumption of consumptive public goods, 
use a dynamic portfolio choice model to examine the effect of tax rates on growth.  Here 
the authors find that evasion rates respond negatively to higher tax rates and the resulting 
increases in evasion are beneficial for economic growth.  However, in addition to 
omitting public investments, the model does not allow for the cost of evasion, which the 
authors concede could alter the results.
While the theoretical literature on tax evasion and growth has received some 
attention recently, the empirical literature is much sparser.  Some studies of the effects of 
tax reform, particularly with respect to VAT reforms as this tax is generally assumed to 
make evasion more difficult, on an economy may capture some of the effects, however 
these are too intertwined with other factors to draw conclusions  (Bolton and Dollery 
2005, Emran and Stiglitz 2005, Hines 2004, Spiro 1993).  Meanwhile, other studies have 
employed simulations to test theoretical models (Chen 2003).  
However, to date there are no significant empirical studies that have specifically 
addressed the macroeconomic effects of tax evasion on a wide scale.  While the 
relationship between taxes and growth in general has generated a good deal of literature 
(see Lee and Gordon (2005), Romer and Romer (2010), and Barro and Redlick (2011) for 
examples), tax evasion is different from overall tax policy due to its illicit nature and 
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 commission by a certain subset of the population which could create differential effects 
between payers and non-payers.  Because of this difference from general tax policy, this 
study seeks to fill the gap in empirical literature on evasion and growth.
Theory and methods
Modeling the relationship between tax enforcement factors and economic growth 
begins with Barro's (1990) standard AK model of endogenous growth with pubic 
expenditure as modified by Chen (2003) to incorporate taxes and tax evasion.  In this 
model of growth representative households maximize discounted lifetime utility of:
∫
0
∞
e−ρt c
1−σ( t)−1
1−σ
dt (1)
where ρ is the time-preference rate,  σ is the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution and c(t) is the private consumption expenditure2.  The firm's production 
function is given by:
y (t)=Ak η( t )g 1−η( t) (2)
where 0<η<1,  y(t) is output per capita, A is the technology level, k(t) is capital input per 
capita, and g(t) is the productive government services in time t, such as infrastructure or 
property rights enforcement.  Government services are provided freely to producers and 
funded through a tax on income.  Disposable income available to households thus takes 
2 This model can be extended to include government consumption expenditure in the consumer's utility 
function.  While this inclusion does affect the optimal level of income reporting,  β*, it ultimately does 
not affect the comparative statics of the changes of increased enforcement on the optimal consumption 
path.  An increase (or decrease) in tax revenue will result in an increase (decrease) of either government 
consumption expenditure or government investment (or both), both of which have a positive (negative) 
impact on consumption growth.  In this case, the inclusion of government consumption expenditure is 
omitted to simplify the analysis. 
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 the form of: 
yd=(1− p)[(1−τβ)−h0(1−β)
2] y+ p [(1−τβ)−h0(1−β)
2−π τ(1−β)] y≡(1−τE) y (3)
where  τE≡τ[1−(1−β)(1− pπ)]+h0(1−β)
2 is the economy's effective tax rate.  As with 
partial equilibrium models of tax evasion, households have the choice to report a portion 
of their income, given by β, on which they must pay taxes of τ.  Alternatively, the 
household can chose to evade taxes, with the risk of being caught of p and subject to a 
penalty of π on the evaded portion of income, (1- β).  The term h0 is a composite term that 
captures the costs and the opportunities for evasion and can be written as h0=C/O.  The 
parameter C captures a number of costs associated with evasion, such as the necessity of 
employing resources in the actual hiding of income.  Following Bayer (2004), O 
represents the opportunities for evasion that differ between tax payers.  For example, 
employees subject to withholding have less opportunity to evade than the self-employed 
that voluntarily report their earnings.  The marginal cost and opportunity to evade are 
increasing and decreasing, respectively, in the amount of evasion, resulting in a 
decreasing returns to evasion3.     
The capital stock increases with savings, given by the difference between 
disposable income and consumption:
3 This disposable income model is based on the standard Allingham and Sandmo model of tax evasion 
(1972).  However, actual evasion levels fall well short of theoretical predictions (Alm, McClelland and 
Schulze 1992; Graetz and Wilde 1985), and a number of attempts have been made to reconcile the 
theoretical predictions with the empirical results (see Hashimzade, Myles, et al. 2010 for a review).  
Despite this shortcoming, the theoretical predictions for the enforcement parameters hold, with higher 
audit rates and cost of evasion resulting in lower levels of evasion (Dubin, Graetz, et al. 1990; Alm 
2012; Alm and Jacobson 2007).  Since these are the parameters of concern for this study, the naive 
model evasion will suffice in giving the appropriate theoretical predictions without additional 
complications.
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 k˙=(1−τ E) y−c (4)
To complete the model, the government's budget constraint is given by:
τ [β+ p π(1−β)] y≡T= f 0 py+g (5)
where f0 is an audit cost parameter, giving total tax enforcement costs of f0py. 
To find the optimal values for the parameters under government control, the 
household's optimization problem must first be solved.  The household maximizes 
lifetime utility (1) subject to its disposable income and savings (2)-(4).  The resulting 
Hamiltonian equation is given by:
max
cβ
J= c
1−σ(t )−1
1−σ
e−ρ t+λ {(1−τ[β+ p π(1−β)]−h0(1−β)
2)Ak ηg1−η−c } (6)
and the first order conditions are:
∂ J
∂β
=λ (−τ(1− pπ) y+ 2h0(1−β) y )=0
τ(1− p π)=2h0(1−β) (7)
β*=1−(1− p π) τ
(2h0)
(7.1)
∂ J
∂ c
=e−ρ t c−σ−λ=0
−σ ln c−ρt= ln λ (8)
lim
t → 0
k (t )λ(t )=0 (9)
Denoting c˙≡dc/ dt and λ˙≡d λ/dt , and rearranging (8) gives the following:
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 ∂ J
∂ c∂ t
=−σ c˙
c
−ρ=λ˙
λ
λ˙
λ
=−Aη( g
k
)
1−η
(1−τE)
c˙
c
= 1σ {Aη(
g
k
)
1−η
(1−τ E)−ρ} (10)
Equation (7) gives the household's optimal degree of tax evasion at the point at which the 
marginal benefit of tax evasion equals the marginal cost of evasion, with the optimal level 
of evasion shown by (7.1).  The optimal amount of evasion depends on the probability of 
audit, the fine rate, and the tax rate, all of which the government controls.  Additionally, 
the costs associated with evading enters into the optimal evasion level.  While the 
government does not directly control this, policy makers can influence this measure to 
some extent.  Consistent with the partial equilibrium tax evasion literature, the amount of 
evasion is decreasing in the probability of audit, the cost of evasion and the fine rate and 
is ambiguous with respect to tax rates.  Equation (9) is the transversality condition that 
ensures capital does not grow too fast.  Finally, equation (10) is the growth rate of 
consumption determined by the difference between the marginal rate of return on capital 
and the time-preference rate.  Similar to the tax evasion decision, the household adjusts 
consumption growth as well according to the parameters set by the government, with the 
tax enforcement parameters entering into the function through the effective tax rate, τE.
Given the household's response to the government controlled parameters, the 
government can now solve its maximization problem.  Combining the government budget 
constraint (5) with the production function (2) and rearranging gives:
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 g
k
=A1 /η[ τE−h0(1−β)
2− f 0p ]
1 / η (11)
In this model, the government maximizes consumption, or economic, growth by choosing 
an optimal tax rate.  Thus the objective function is:
Max
τ
c˙
c
= 1σ {A
1 /ηη[ τE−h0(1−β)
2− f 0 p]
(1−η)/η(1−τE)−ρ} (12)
Maximizing and taking into account the best response tax evasion function of the 
households (7) yields: 
1−η
η (1−
1− pπ
h0
τ*)(1−τ*+1−p π
4h0
τ*2)=(τ*−1−p π
2h0
τ*2− f 0p)(1−
1−p π
2h0
τ*) (13)
The government sets τ* to a value where the left hand side of equation (13), the marginal 
benefit of taxation due to increases in g equals the right hand side, the marginal cost of 
taxation due to lower disposable income and capital growth.  Equation (13) has three 
roots:
τ1
*=
h0
(1− pπ)2
, τ2
*=
2[h0−√ x ]
(1−p π)2(1+ η)
, τ3
*=
2[h0+ √ x ]
(1−p π)2(1+ η)
where x=h02−h0(1−η+ f 0 p η)(1−pπ)2(1+ η) .  Of these three roots, τ2* results in the 
highest growth rate, thus globally maximizing the government's objective function.  With 
these results, the equilibrium can be defined, with the optimal tax rate τ2*, the equilibrium 
rate of tax evasions is:
β*=1−
1−√1−(1−η+ f 0 p η)(1− pπ)2(1+ η)/h0
(1− pπ)2(1+ η)
(14)
with an equilibrium tax rate of:
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 τE
* =
η
1+ η
2[h0−√h02−h0(1−η+ f 0 p η)(1−p π)2(1+ η)]
(1− pπ)2(1+ η)
+
(1−η+ f 0 p η)
1+ η
(15)
and an equilibrium growth rate of:
c˙
c
= 1σ {A
1/ ηη[(τE
*−(1−p π)
2
4h0
(τ2
*)− f 0 p)
(1−η)/η
(1−τ E
* )]−ρ} (16)
The effects of changes in parameters under government control on growth and tax 
evasion levels can be derived from this equilibrium growth rate.  Specifically, this study 
examines the changes in the costs of evasion h0, as well as the enforcement parameter p, 
the probability of audit.
The government has some control over the costs, both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary, of evasion borne by tax evaders.  Government appeals to patriotism can 
increase tax morale, creating higher social costs for tax evasion (Konrad and Qari 2009).  
In low tax morale societies, tax evasion is more acceptable, thus households or firms can 
more easily engage the services of lawyers or accountants to aid in evasion.  Similarly, a 
high level of corruption in the tax authorities is theoretically associated with higher 
evasion rates (Chander and Wilde 1992).  Corrupt tax administrations lower the cost of 
tax evasion, making it easier to engage in evasion and increasing evasion rates. Even in 
highly corrupt societies, where the bribe rate becomes the de facto tax rate and the 
subsequent h0  remains elevated due to high bribe rates, the cost of evasion is still less 
than or equal to that of a non-corrupt society.4 Government reforms to reduce corruption 
4 If the bribe rate becomes the de facto tax rate, corrupt tax collectors would be viewed as the 
“government” and firms would seek to hide their income from them using the same methods used to 
hide revenue from non-corrupt officials.  Thus, at a maximum, the costs of evasion in corrupt and non-
corrupt societies are equal.  Conversely, bribing tax officials could obviate the need for complicated 
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 in the tax authority could serve to increase the cost of evasion.  The overall effect of 
increasing evasion costs on economic growth can be divided into a direct and indirect 
effect.  While the direct effect of increasing the cost of tax evasion on consumption 
growth is negative, the indirect effects are ambiguous, resulting in an ambiguous total 
effect.  The theoretical effect of policies that increase evasion costs can be derived by 
(16) using τE≡τ2[1−(1−β)(1− pπ)]+ h0(1−β)
2
 and rewriting:
c˙
c
= 1σ {A
1 /ηη[(τ2
* [1−(1−β*)(1− pπ)]− f 0 p)
(1−η)/η(1−τ2
* [1−(1−β*)(1−pπ)]+h0(1−β
*)2)]−ρ} (17)
Taking the derivative with respect to the cost of taxation, ho, results in:
d c˙
c
dh0
(?)
=
∂ c˙
c
∂ h0
(-)
+
∂ c˙
c
∂(1−β*)
(?)
d (1−β*)
dh0
(-)
+
∂ c˙
c
∂ τ2
*
(?)
d τ2
*
dh0
(-)
(18)
The overall effect is ambiguous due to two indirect effects.  First, while increasing 
evasion costs will decrease tax evasion rates, the effect of lower tax evasion on growth is 
ambiguous.  Similarly, higher tax evasion costs reduce the optimal tax rate.  More 
revenue collect from higher compliance rates associated with large evasion costs 
mitigates the need for the government to increase tax rates to generate more revenue.  
However, the effect of tax rates on economic growth is also ambiguous5, making the total 
indirect effect uncertain. 
revenue hiding schemes, thus lowering the cost of evasion in corrupt societies.
5 While the theoretical results of lower tax rates on growth are ambiguous in this model, the empirical 
literature indicates ∂ c˙ /c /∂ τ  is negative (Lee and Gordon 2005; Mullen and Williams 1994).  This 
suggests that this indirect effect of higher evasion costs will result greater growth 
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 Equation (17) can also be used to find the theoretical effect of tax enforcement 
audits on economic growth.  
d c˙
c
d p
(?)
=
∂ c˙
c
∂ p
(?)
+
∂ c˙
c
∂(1−β*)
(?)
d (1−β*)
dp
(? or -)
+
∂ c˙
c
∂ τ2
*
(?)
d τ2
*
dp
(? or -)
(19)
The direct as well as the indirect effects of changes in tax enforcement have a 
theoretically ambiguous effect on economic growth.  Increased probability of detection 
serves to reduce disposable income and increase government revenue as a greater number 
of evaders are caught and forced to pay back taxes and fines.  While reduced disposable 
income lowers savings and investment, increased government revenue allows for more 
public goods to be provided.  Thus the direct effect is ambiguous.  As with the effect of 
the cost of tax evasion on growth, the effects of tax evasion and tax rates are ambiguous.  
When tax enforcement costs, f0p, are high, dτ2*/dp is ambiguous as is d(1- β*)/dp.  When 
enforcement costs are low, both terms are negative for reasons similar to the channels by 
which changes in tax evasion costs affect tax and evasion rates.
Given the ambiguous theoretical effect of tax evasion and of factors affecting tax 
evasion on economic growth, empirical testing can shed further light on the relationship.  
Using equations (18) and (19), this study tests the effects of audit probabilities and costs 
of evasion on economic growth.  
The main econometric specifications for this study follow directly from (18) and 
(19):
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 ln(GDPpercapita i)=β0+ β1 pi+ β2 hi+β3 evasi+ β4 taxi+ βn X i+ u (20)
where GDPpercapitai is the GDP per capita for country i, hi and pi are the variables of 
interest, the cost of evasion and the probability of audit, evas and tax are the evasion and 
tax rate, and X is a vector of control variables.
The estimates of β3 and β4  are also of interest to this analysis.  While these are 
endogenously determined in the theoretical model, it is likely that there is some 
exogenous component to evasion and tax rates.  In particular, tax rates, which are set by 
policy makers and subject to political economy considerations, may not conform to the 
optimal rates specified in the model.  Further, from the theoretical model, the overall 
effect of changes in these variables on growth is ambiguous.  As discussed earlier, 
understanding the effect of evasion on growth is important as that insight would guide 
policy decisions on reducing evasion if it negatively affects growth or perhaps engaging 
in benign neglect if evasion is shown to increase growth.  Similarly, the effect of tax rates 
on growth is an important aspect of public policy decision and is the subject of a wide 
and mixed body of literature.
This specification gives rise to an identification issue with respect to the variables 
of interest, audit probability and evasion costs.  Because tax evasion and the tax rate are 
endogenously determined by the costs of evasion and the probability of audit, the total 
effect of changes in audit probabilities or evasion costs is masked by the evasion and tax 
rate variables.  With this specification,  β1 and β2 will capture the direct effect of audits 
and evasion costs, but their indirect effects will be captured in β3 and β4.  As a result the 
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 estimates of the audit probability and evasion costs will be biased.  In effect, this 
relationship can be represented by the following recursive system of equations:
evasi=α0+ α1 pi+ α2 h i+ u1 (21)
taxi=γ0+ γ1 pi+ γ2h i+ u2 (22)
ln (GDPpercapita i)=β0+ β1 pi+ β2 hi+β3 evasi+ β4 taxi+ u3 (23)
Equations (21) and (22) are identified and can be estimated through OLS, however 
further exclusion restrictions are required for full identification of (23) (Green 2003).  
Specifically, when the Cov(u1,2,u3)=0, then equation (23) is also fully identified and thus 
each equation in the system can be consistently estimated using OLS.   Effectively, the 
log of per capita GDP becomes a linear function of p, h, u1 and u2 which are uncorrelated 
with u3 resulting in a fully identified model.
The estimation procedure uses estimates of u1 and u2 as proxies for evas and tax 
respectively, thus  (23) takes the form of:
ln(GDPpercapita i)=β0+ β1 pi+ β2 hi+β3 u1+β4 u2+ βn X i+ u3 (24)
The residuals from equation (21) and (22) are the variation in tax evasion and tax rates 
once the effects of the probability of audit and evasion costs have been removed.  With 
these residuals only capturing exogenous changes in evasion and tax rates, the indirect 
effects of changes in the audit rate or evasion costs is incorporated into β1 and β2 
respectively, providing the unbiased total effect of those variables.
There is a great deal of literature finding a wide variety of factors partially related 
to economic growth (Sala-I-Martin 1997).  Correspondingly, critics of these models have 
raised concern regarding the “fragility” of significant results (Levine and Renelt 1992).  
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 The problem arises due to the chosen specification, particularly the vector of control 
variables used.  Since the “true” model is not known, the inclusion of the appropriate 
control vectors is left to the discretion of the researcher.  Consequently, a significant 
result for the variable of interest with one set of controls can become insignificant with 
another set of controls, even if the change in controls is only one variable.
To examine the issue of “fragility”, Levine and Renault (1992) employ an 
extreme bound analysis to determine if the coefficient on the variable of interest is robust. 
Given the stringent nature of the extreme bound test, the variable of interest is rarely 
found to be robust.  Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that the extreme bound analysis may be 
too strong for any variable to pass, thus producing no robust variables.  Instead, Sala-i-
Martin proposes a test that finds the weighted average of all potential estimates and 
assigns a confidence interval to the variable in question.  
This study will test the robustness of the results using the Sala-i-Martin method.  
This test consists of running regressions with every combination of control variable.  The 
subsequent parameter estimates are then averaged to find the mean estimate of the 
parameter of interest, βz, by:
β̂z=∑
j=1
M
w zjβzj
where the weights, wzj are proportional to the likelihoods as models with high likelihoods 
are assumed to be closer to the “true” model.  Thus the weights are:
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 w zj=
Lzj
∑
i=1
M
Lzi
likewise, the weighted average variance is constructed as: 
σ̂ z
2=∑
j=1
M
w zjσ zj
2
Assuming the distribution of β is normal, once these measures are estimated, the 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) can be calculated and inferences made.  
Alternatively, if the distribution of β is not normal, then the inference testing can still be 
conducted by calculating the CDF for each estimate separately, then aggregating the 
individual CDFs with the appropriate weights (Sala-I-Martin 1997).  While this method 
provides some defense against “fragility”, care should still be taken with the results as the 
issue of omitted variable bias remains since every relevant control variable can not 
included. 
Data
Tax evasion, corruption, and audit rate data for this study come from a 
compilation of survey data from the World Bank.  Through the first decade of the 
millennium, the World Bank conducted the World Enterprise Survey (WES)  and 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), polls of individual 
firms regarding their business environment.  The survey data covers 103 mostly 
developing countries and includes over 71,000 firms.
In addition to the firm level survey data, the World Bank also publishes World 
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 Development Indicators (WDI) that provides additional measures of evasion, corruption 
and audit rates.  While many of the countries in this data set overlap the countries 
surveyed in the WES, additional countries available in the WDI data provides added 
robustness.
Tax evasion in the WES is measured through an indirect question regarding what 
the firm thinks the typical firm in their industry reports as their taxable revenue to 
authorities.  Due to the sensitive nature of the topic, indirect survey questions are 
preferred to direct questions of tax evasion as direct questions can lead to non-response or 
inaccurate responses  (Gërxhani 2007).  However, the respondent's answer to the indirect 
question is typically informed by their own experiences in the activity, and thus is 
indicative of their own behavior.  Thus, in the absence of high quality audit data from the 
central government, the next best measure of tax evasion is through indirect survey 
questions.  Further, because a third party, not the government, conducts the survey, 
participants should be more likely to be forthcoming as their confidentiality is assured.
As a measure of firm tax evasion, this variable is also dependent on the 
characteristics of firms being surveyed.  To account for potential differences in reporting 
behavior in firms across countries, a first stage regression of reporting rates on firm 
characteristics and country specific fixed effects is performed to obtain the conditional 
mean reporting rates for each country.  Once the coefficients for this regression are 
obtained, the estimates on the country specific fixed effects are the mean sales reporting 
rates conditional on firm characteristics.  These country specific means are then used as 
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 the measure of sales reported for tax purposes in the WES analysis.  Alternatively, the 
WDI data measures tax evasion as the simply the percentage of firms that did not fully 
report their income for tax purposes.
Corruption in the WES data is measured through the firms' response to questions 
regarding bribery of tax officials, either solicited or unsolicited.  As outlined previously, 
higher levels of corruption indicate a lower cost of tax evasion, thus leading to greater tax 
evasion.  As such, high levels of bribery of tax officials represent low levels of hi and can 
serve as a proxy of other tax evasion costs. Similarly, corruption in the WDI data is 
measured as the percentage of firms that have engaged in bribery to deal with taxes. 
Finally, the WES data contains data if the respondent firm was audited in the 
previous year.  This measure can be used to find a conditional probability of audit as the 
firm was selected for audit based on some attributes observable to the tax authorities.  For 
example, firms with large revenues are routinely audited at higher rates than smaller 
firms.  Because this conditional audit probability only applies to firms chosen for audit, it 
is not the unconditional audit probability faced by all firms in the economy.  As such, 
finding an unconditional probability of audit can be likened to a selection problem as the 
audited firms are selected for audit.  To find the economy wide audit probability, this 
study first estimates a selection equation of the form:
p=δ X +ϵ (25)
where p is if the firm was audited or not and X is a vector of observable firm 
characteristics that may influence the authority's decision to audit.  These characteristics 
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 include the firm's size, legal organization,  age,  industry and type of ownership.  The 
conditional probability of audit is given by:
P ( p=1 | X )=δ X (26)
while the full probability of audit is given by (25).  To find the unconditional audit 
probability that all firms in the economy face (27) must be subtracted from (26) giving:
P ( p=1)−P ( p=1 | X ) = δ X + ϵ−δ X = ϵ (27)
Thus the estimated errors from the selection model can be used as the measurement of the 
base audit rate faced economy wide. 
While the WDI data does not contain any direct information on audit rates, a 
measure of the average number of meetings firms must spend with tax officials provides 
information on audits.  The higher the average number of meetings, the greater the audit 
probability.  If each audited firm meets with tax officials once, then the average number 
of meetings across all firms will be the audit rate.  Higher audit rates will results in more 
meetings with tax officials across the country which will be reflected in the WDI 
measure.  This is not a perfect measure of audit rate as many firms will have more than 
one meeting with tax officials or tax officials may be placed in larger companies, 
obviating the need for audits.  However, it does provide and additional way to examine 
the effects of audit probabilities.
From the firm level, the WES measurements of tax evasion, corruption and audit 
probability will be aggregated to the country level by taking the appropriately weighted 
average value for each variable.  The resulting averages are subsequently combined with 
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 data collected by Martinez-Vazquez and Bird (2011) to form a macroeconomic data set 
that includes GDP, tax rates and other country level controls.  The WDI data, already 
aggregated to country-level, is also merged with the Martinez-Bird data for the analysis.  
Table 3.1 lists and describes all variables used for the WES/WDI analysis.  Similarly, 
Table 3.2 reports summary statistics for all aggregated WES/WDI variables.
The Martinez-Vazquez and Bird data also provide additional variables by which to 
measure the effect of tax shortfalls on economic growth.  This data set provides measures 
of the VAT tax gap for a panel of 86 countries over 19 years which provides an additional 
way to analyze the effect of tax collections on growth.  Table 3.3 provides variable 
descriptions and Table 3.4 provides summary statistics for this data.
The VAT covers the same base, firm revenues, as the survey measure of evasion 
from the WES/BEEPS data.  In addition to evasion, the tax gap can fluctuate with 
administrative effectiveness and other measurement issues discussed below.  While the 
entire tax gap cannot be attributed to tax evasion, a large body of literature routinely uses 
the tax gap as a measure of evasion.  Importantly, this measure also captures significant 
information about tax administration quality.  Higher quality administrations will enforce 
tax laws more efficiently, thereby increasing the costs of evasion or the chances of being 
caught.  The effect of higher evasion costs and detection probabilities will be to
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 Table 3.1: WES/WDI Variable Descriptions
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Variable Description
WES/WDI Analysis
PPP Converted GDP per capita chained at 2005 constant prices
inspect Audit probability 
tax_inform Informal payment requested to deal with taxes
Percentage of firms that payed a bribe to deal with taxes
Tax rate
Percentage of sales reported for tax purposes
Percentage of firms not reporting all sales
Share of population in urban centers
Education Index
Member of European Union
as Member of the Americas
Member of Central Europe
Member of Asia/Pacific
Member of Africa
Member of Northern Africa/Middle East
Capital Formation
inflation Inflation
Health Expenditures
save Savings rate
fertility Fertility rate
Foreign Direct Investment
Natural Log of 1970 GDP
protestant Percentage Protestant
catholic Percentage Catholic
Percentage Muslim
Government effectiveness index
Rule of law index
Political stability index
rgdpch
lnrgdpch Natural log of rgdpch
taxbribe
vatrate
reprt_sales
taxevade
urbanshare
educind
eu
ce
ap
af
nmed
capform
hlthexpend
fdi
beggpd
muslim
goveff
rlaw
polstab
 Table 3.2: WES/WDI Summary Statistics
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Variable Obs Mean Min Max
105 7034.32 7249.86 373.73 37032.43
105 8.28 1.17 5.92 10.52
inspect 76 0.09 0.46 -0.84 0.97
tax_inform 76 25.26 21.73 0.00 84.97
94 26.94 22.85 0.00 84.52
94 16.20 3.87 5.00 23.00
76 78.34 16.72 32.57 97.03
open 101 0.87 0.34 0.36 2.04
97 0.52 0.20 0.10 0.92
97 0.70 0.24 0.15 0.99
105 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
as 105 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
105 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
105 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00
105 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
105 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
99 24.11 6.45 10.14 41.53
inflation 101 6.75 5.05 0.04 34.70
105 6.55 2.30 2.08 13.33
save 90 18.94 8.86 -2.14 42.80
fertility 105 3.16 1.66 1.08 7.26
105 5.61 7.40 -15.03 46.83
67 21.14 1.65 17.77 24.84
protestant 103 12.50 16.58 0.01 68.00
catholic 102 31.27 33.14 0.01 97.00
104 25.38 33.72 0.00 99.90
105 0.28 0.73 -1.43 1.76
105 0.33 0.74 -1.46 1.57
105 0.28 0.82 -2.40 1.30
Std. Dev.
rgdpch
lnrgdpch
taxbribe
vatrate
reprt_sales
urbanshare
educind
eu
ce
ap
af
nmed
capform
hlthexpend
fdi
beggpd
muslim
goveff
rlaw
polstab
 Table 3.3: Tax Gap Analysis Variables and Descriptions
Table 3.4: Tax Gap Analysis Summary Statistics
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Variable Variable Description
VAT Collection Efficiency
C-Efficiency
Gross Collection Efficiency
bureau Bureaucracy Quality (0-4 points; 4 indicating strong bureaucracy)
durable Regime Durability: Number of years since most recent regime change.
open (Imports + Exports) / GDP
VAT System Dummy
Crude petrol per capita consumption (in 000 metric tons)
Share of population in urban centers
pop2 Population (in tens of millions)
GDP per capita in constant 2000 USD (Millions)
tmorale1 Tax Morale (percentage of individuals expressing cheating on taxes never justified)
Dependency Ratio
developed Developed Country Dummy
neigh_collect Weighted Average of Neighbor's Collection Efficiency
ve
ceff
gc
vatd
petrolpc
urbanshare
gdp
lngdp Natural log of gdp
agedep
Variable Obs Mean Min  Max
1096 35.853 14.297 0.166 96.183
1041 46.052 18.856 0.250 134.286
1085 58.913 26.150 0.304 195.891
gdp2000usd 1947 290257 1054399 187.096 1.15E+007
1947 10.294 2.262 5.232 16.258
2033 0.724 0.447 0 1
tmorale1 1273 0.718 0.148 0.266 1.17
1992 0.602 0.163 0.252 1.100
1734 0.819 0.165 0 0.993
developed 2033 0.264 0.441 0 1
bureau 1599 2.540 1.101 0 4
durable 1833 28.145 34.761 0 199
open 1958 0.845 0.493 0 4.57
1490 0.002 0.005 0 0.038
2033 0.587 0.224 0.054 1
pop2 2009 4.736 15.711 0.00401 133
Std. Dev.
ve
ceff
gc
lngdp
vatd
agedep
educind
petrolpc
urbanshare
 increase tax collections, resulting in higher collection efficiency ratios.  As a result, these 
collection ratios can be used as an indicator of the effects of tax administration and tax 
evasion on growth.
This data set provides three measures of the tax gap: the VAT Efficiency ratio, the 
C-efficiency ratio, and the Gross Collection measure.  While the base for each ratio is 
consumption, each measure is differentiated on how consumption is measured.  The VAT 
Efficient ratio is based on GDP and is calculated as:
VE=
Rv
τvat∗GDP
(28)
where VE is the efficiency ratio, Rv  is the total actual revenue collected from the VAT, 
and τvat is the tax rate for the VAT.  Similarly, the C-efficiency ratio and the Gross 
Collection ratio are calculated as:
CE=
Rv
τvat∗ConsT
(29)
GC=
Rv
τvat∗ConsP
(30)
where ConsT and ConsP are total consumption expenditure and private consumption 
expenditure respectively.  In each ratio, the denominator gives the total theoretical 
amount of VAT revenue.  Due to a variety of factors, the actual revenue collected falls 
short of this theoretical total.  In implementation, none of the tax bases used in these 
ratios are actual bases for functioning VATs.  Exemptions and zero-ratings narrow the 
base and multiple tax rates change the actual denominator further.  Because low 
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 efficiency ratios can arise due to evasion or other factors like narrow bases, the 
relationship between tax evasion and the tax gap across countries is not consistent.  The 
panel nature of the data mitigates this issue somewhat as a fixed effects estimator can be 
employed to estimate within country variation.  While the other factors affecting the tax 
base are not necessarily time invariant, the changes in the tax base can be relatively 
infrequent resulting in most of the variation in within-country collection efficiency 
coming from collection issues. 
Despite these measurement difficulties, these measures do contain information on 
the level of tax evasion as evasion leads to smaller numerators with respect to the 
denominator.  Therefore, all else equal, economies with relatively larger levels of tax 
evasion will have ratios closer to zero, while countries with low levels of evasion will 
have ratios closer to one.
The tax collection efficiency ratio captures the full effect of tax enforcement and 
tax evasion, and therefore can be used to examine the combined effect of all factors.  The 
WES/WDI analysis uses specific information on enforcement and evasion to disentangle 
the effects and measures only the direct effect of evasion costs and audit probabilities on 
growth.  Combining (5) and a generalized version of (28) yields:
E= R
τ∗GDP
=
τ[β+ pπ(1−β)] y
τ∗y
=[β+ pπ(1−β)] (31)
Since optimal tax evasion, (1- β), is a function of tax rates, enforcement and evasion 
costs, the efficiency ratio is a function of these variables as well.
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 As with the WES/WDI analysis, the dependent variable for this tax gap analysis is 
the natural log of GDP and the specification takes the form of:
ln(GDPpercapita it)=β0+β1 ERit+βn X i+γC+u (32)
where ER is the efficiency ratio of interest, X is a vector of control variables, and C is a 
vector of country fixed effects.
While the country fixed effects control for time invariant factors, the efficiency 
ratio is still endogenous as collections are determined by tax and evasion rates as well.  
An instrumental variable (IV) approach is used to account for this endogeneity.  The 
variable used as an instrument for the efficiency ratio is the average collection efficiency 
of that ratio of other countries weighted by the inverse square root of the distance 
between capitals.  High efficiency ratios in other countries should be associated with 
higher collections as tax administrations learn best practices from their neighbors.  While 
sharing of knowledge between governments should be greater between neighboring 
countries due to proximity, distance does not preclude policy makers from learning best 
practices from further abroad.  In essence, effective tax administration will spillover into 
other countries as policy makers share information.  However, it is not likely that a 
neighbors effectiveness in tax collection will significantly affect economic growth.  
Further, as shown above the tax gap is endogenously determined by evasion costs and 
expected penalties.  The use of an instrument variable will account for this endogeneity 
and identify the full effect of the tax gap on growth, not just the partial direct effect of 
audit probabilities and evasion costs as in the WES/WDI analysis.  The enforcement 
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 levels of a neighbor's tax administration is exogenously determined by factors in that 
country, but that country's experiences in implementation can be shared.  As such, the 
weighted average of neighboring countries' collection efficiency satisfies both conditions 
of an instrumental variable for collection efficiency.
Results
The first results come from the regression to find unconditional audit probabilities 
at the firm level using the WES data.  Table 3.5 reports the results from the first stage 
regressions.  Column one details the logit regression of being audited on a variety of firm 
characteristics and industry indicators.  Unsurprisingly, larger firms in terms of sales and 
employees are more likely to be audited as are domestically privately owned firms.  
Further, closed companies and partnerships are less likely to be audited than the omitted 
category of listed companies and more established companies are audited less.  From 
these results, the residual unexplained probabilities of audit are obtained and, when 
aggregated to the country level, provide the country level audit probabilities.
Column two shows the results from the first stage regression of sales reported for 
tax purposes on firm characteristics and country fixed effects.  Firms with high levels of 
sales report more, as do firms that are older and more established.  Further, closed 
companies report more sales for tax purposes than the omitted category of listed firms.
Table 3.6 presents results from both the WES and WDI specifications.  The results 
are weighted estimates of 1,793 regressions combining the four variables of interest and 
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 1, 2, and 3 variable combinations of 22 controls.  The WES regressions show that evasion 
costs, as measured by corruption of tax officials, is statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  However, this result is tempered by a lack of significance in the WDI regressions.  
As predicted by (18), the direct effect of reduced evasion costs is positive growth.  Higher 
tax official corruption rates reduces the costs of evasion, freeing resources to be used 
productively, thus increasing GDP.  A one point increase in the percentage of tax officials 
requesting a bribe results in an increase of 0.012 percent in GDP.  
While this result may seem contradictory to a well established literature showing 
corruption reduces growth and seems to indicate that private investment is more 
productive than public spending, the result here only measures the direct effect of a very 
specific type of corruption in reducing the costs of evasion.  This result is therefore not 
necessarily inconsistent with the wider corruption and growth literature as this result does 
not speak to the full effects of economy wide corruption.
Like evasion costs, which is significant only in the WES regressions, audit 
probabilities are statistically significant in only the WES data.  While imprecisely 
measured, the number of tax meetings does take the same sign as the audit probabilities 
from the WES data.  While the theoretical direct effect of audit probability is ambiguous,  
higher audit probabilities, as measured by adjusted audit rates empirically have the direct 
effect of reducing GDP.  In the WES regressions, a one percentage point increase in audit
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 Table 3.5: WES/WDI First Stage Results
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(1) (2)
VARIABLES report_sales
Ln(Sales) 0.0114*** 1.289***
(0.000522) (0.173)
Number of Employees 5.61e-05*** -0.001
(6.07e-06) (0.000)
Years of Operation -0.000274* 0.026*
(0.000154) (0.014)
Closed Company -0.0690*** 3.580**
(0.0120) (1.491)
Sole Proprietorship -0.00902 -0.683
(0.0128) (1.617)
Partnership -0.0439*** 1.669
(0.0137) (1.780)
Public 0.0480 2.038
(0.0411) (3.511)
Other Legal Org. -0.0304 1.485
(0.0187) (1.790)
Domestic Private Ownership 0.0814*** 1.228
(0.00782) (0.739)
State Ownership 0.0414 3.222
(0.0365) (3.139)
Constant 0.487*** 65.317***
(0.0503) (3.844)
Observations 39139 32292
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Industry Fixed Effects not reported.
tax_inspec
 probabilities results in a 1.015 percent decline in GDP.  One possible channel for this 
result is that higher audit probabilities necessitate more government resources spent on 
enforcement, resources that can not be used for other productive services.  Higher 
probabilities of audits and more audits also mean firms must spend additional resources 
on compliance instead of more productive uses.
Also significant in the WES regressions, but not in the WDI regressions, is tax 
evasion.  Both estimates are consistent in sign as the WDI variable measures the 
percentage of firms engaged in tax evasion, while the WES variable measures the 
opposite of the average level of tax compliance.  The WES measure of tax compliance is 
significant at the 10% level, with an increase in tax compliance resulting in greater GDP 
growth.  Specifically, a one percentage point increase in sales reported by firms for tax 
purposes results in 0.014 percent increase in GDP.  However, care should be taken with 
this result as evasion could be endogenous, with richer countries experiencing lower 
levels of evasion, instead of lower levels of evasion creating greater growth.  Since the 
primary variables of interest in this study are evasion costs and enforcement probabilities, 
this potential endogeniety should not invalidate the analysis.
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 Table 3.6: WES/WDI Analysis Results
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WES WDI
VARIABLES
-1.015*** -0.05
(0.308) (0.071)
0.012** -0.001
(0.006) (0.005)
0.014* -0.006
(0.007) (0.005)
-0.022 -0.011
(0.028) (0.024)
0.057*** 0.053***
(0.02) (0.019)
0.064*** 0.08***
(0.021) (0.019)
0.111*** 0.127***
(0.02) (0.017)
-0.001* -0.001**
(0.001) (0)
catholic 0.0005 0.001**
(0.0005) (0.0005)
protestant -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
0.024*** 0.023***
(0.009) (0.007)
-0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
fertility -0.048*** -0.048***
(0.006) (0.004)
save 0.003** 0.003*
(0.001) (0.002)
0.009 0.013
(0.012) (0.01)
inflation -0.003 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
-0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Weighted Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
lngdpch lngdpch
inspect/taxmeet
tax_inform/taxbribe
reprt_sales/taxevade
taxrate
polstab
rlaw
goveff
muslim
beggpd
fdi
hlthexpend
capform
 Table 3.6 cnt.: WES/WDI Analysis Results
In addition to these variables of interest showing statistical significance, a number 
of the control variables are also shown to be drivers of growth.  Urban, and educated 
economies experience greater growth as do politically stable and well governed countries. 
Countries with larger Catholic populations experience greater growth, while larger 
Muslim populations is associated with slightly lower growth.  In line with the literature, 
higher fertility rates generate lower growth.  Beginning GDP is positive, which provides 
some evidence against convergence.  Finally, African countries experience lower growth 
98
WES WDI
VARIABLES
-0.008 0.026
(0.095) (0.058)
-0.13*** -0.156***
(0.037) (0.03)
-0.066 -0.067
(0.053) (0.061)
0.112*** 0.108***
(0.035) (0.035)
as 0.019 0.041
(0.04) (0.037)
0.113*** 0.153***
(0.031) (0.031)
0.325*** 0.335***
(0.055) (0.034)
0.335*** 0.361***
(0.05) (0.036)
open 0.071 0.068
(0.043) (0.042)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Weighted Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
lngdpch lngdpch
nmed
af
ap
ce
eu
educind
urbanshare
 while European Union and Central European countries have higher growth rates.
Table 3.7 gives the p-values for the WES/WDI analysis assuming a non-normal 
distribution of the estimates.  Under this assumption, lower evasion costs and tax evasion 
levels are no longer significant in the WES specifications.  However, the enforcement 
parameters of audit rates remains statistically significant at the 5% level.
Table 3.7:  P-Values for Non-normal β distribution – WES/WDI Analysis 
To conclude the WES analysis, measures of collection efficiency are included as 
measures of tax evasion and results are reported in Table 3.8.  Columns one, two, and 
three show results for the specifications with VAT efficiency, C-efficiency, and Gross 
Collection efficiency respectively.  In all three specifications, higher audit rates result in 
lower GDP growth while higher bribe rates result in higher growth, all with similar 
magnitudes and statistical significance as the initial WES regression.  Additionally, higher 
tax collections as measured by the C-efficiency and Gross Collection efficiency ratios 
have a positive impact on growth, with a one percentage point increase in collection 
efficiencies resulting in a 0.007-0.008 percent increase in GDP.  Amongst the other 
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WES WDI
0.044 0.549
0.189 0.334
0.408 0.477
0.230 0.331
inspect/taxmeet
tax_inform/taxbribe
taxrate
reprt_sales/taxevade
 Table 3.8: WES Analysis with Collection Efficiency
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VAT Efficiency C-Efficiency Gross Collection
Efficiency
VARIABLES
inspect -0.929*** -0.895*** -0.905***
(0.303) (0.305) (0.301)
tax_inform 0.011* 0.011* 0.011*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Collection Efficiency 0.004 0.008* 0.007**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
0.002 0.015 0.017
(0.031) (0.033) (0.032)
0.062*** 0.055*** 0.052**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.069*** 0.062*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.021) (0.021)
0.114*** 0.11*** 0.109***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
-0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
catholic 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
protestant -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.025*** 0.024** 0.024**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
-0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
fertility -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
save 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.009 0.008 0.008
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
inflation -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
0.001 -0.0002 -0.0004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Weighted Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
lngdpch lngdpch lngdpch
taxrate
polstab
rlaw
goveff
muslim
beggpd
fdi
hlthexpend
capform
 Table 3.8 cnt.: WES Analysis with Collection Efficiency
101
VAT Efficiency C-Efficiency Gross Collection
Efficiency
VARIABLES
-0.026 -0.031 -0.032
(0.082) (0.073) (0.076)
-0.139*** -0.125*** -0.121***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.031)
-0.022 -0.05 -0.048
(0.052) (0.044) (0.044)
0.135*** 0.12** 0.105**
(0.038) (0.046) (0.044)
as 0.028 0.033 0.041
(0.042) (0.044) (0.044)
0.123*** 0.115*** 0.111***
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
0.317*** 0.307*** 0.302***
(0.046) (0.049) (0.049)
0.348*** 0.339*** 0.333***
(0.047) (0.049) (0.048)
open 0.067 0.047 0.04
(0.046) (0.052) (0.052)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Weighted Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
lngdpch lngdpch lngdpch
nmed
af
ap
ce
eu
educind
urbanshare
 control variables, magnitudes and significance remain similar to Table 3.5 results, with 
the exception of inflation, which becomes significant in these specifications and is 
estimated to have a negative impact on growth.
While stricter enforcement measures and higher costs of evading seem to restrict 
growth by reducing resources available to the private sector, the inclusion of the 
collection efficiencies in the above specifications make it clear that focusing only on 
these two factors provides an incomplete explanation of tax enforcement and growth. To 
obtain a better picture of the overall effect of tax enforcement policies on growth, the 
wider measures of tax collection efficiency ratios are examined in a panel setting.
Table 3.9 presents the results of the first stage regressions from the fixed effects 
instrumental variable models.  In each specification, the variable neigh_collect refers to 
the weighted average of collection efficiency in neighboring countries and is specific to 
the efficiency ratio being examined.  The first column details the first  stage regressions 
for the VAT efficiency ratio and shows that the weighted average of neighbor's VAT 
efficiency ratios is positively and significantly correlated with the domestic VAT 
efficiency ratio.  Similarly, the weighted averages of neighbor's C-efficiency and Gross 
efficiency ratios, columns two and three, are both positively and significantly correlated 
with the corresponding domestic collection ratios.
The combined effect on growth of enforcement and evasion factors, as measured 
by overall tax collection efficiency ratios, are reported in Tables 3.10-3.12.  Table 3.10 
reports results using the VAT efficiency ratio.  In all specifications, the efficiency ratio is 
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 significant at the 5% level or better.  The Instrument Variable Fixed Effects model is 
reported in column 3, with additional instrument validity statistics at the bottom.  The 
first stage underidentification statistics strongly rejecting the null hypothesis of 
underidentification and the weak identification statistic exceeding the Stock-Yogo 10% 
maximal IV size critical value of 16.38, indicating neigh_collect is a strong instrument 
(Stock and Yogo 2002).  All models produce positive estimates, showing that higher 
collection efficiency results in higher economic growth.
While estimates are significant and positive, the magnitude varies somewhat 
between the models.  The IV-FE model indicates a one percent increase in collection 
efficiency results in a 0.69 percent increase in per capita GDP.  
In addition collection efficiency, a few other variables are consistently significant 
across estimators.  First political stability is a positive driver of economic growth, with 
more stable regimes having higher growth.  A larger number of non-working population 
as indicated by a high age dependency ratio creates a drag on growth.  Finally, more 
honest citizenry, as measured by higher tax morale, create greater growth.
Table 3.11 report similar results for the C-efficiency measure of tax collection.  As 
with the VAT efficiency measure, C-efficiency is statistically significant across all 
specifications at the 5% level or better.  The first stage statistics for the IV-FE model 
remain highly significant, showing the weighted average of neighbor's collections to still 
be a valid instrument.  While the underidentification tests reject the null hypothesis of 
underidentification, the weak identification test statistic only exceeds the critical value of
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 Table 3.9: First Stage Regressions – IV-FE Estimations
 8.96 for the 15% maximal IV size (Stock and Yogo 2002).  
The results of the C-efficiency IV-FE specification are consistent with the VAT 
efficiency results.  The same control variables show similar magnitudes and significance, 
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Variables VE C-Eff GC
neigh_collect 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
0.602*** 0.737*** 0.701***
(0.111) (0.131) (0.131)
tmorale1 -0.158 -0.047 -0.096
(0.113) (0.12) (0.122)
-1.022*** -1.693*** -1.827***
(0.36) (0.368) (0.371)
0.963** 0.748* 0.859**
(0.394) (0.392) (0.385)
developed -0.76*** -0.756*** -0.756***
(0.108) (0.115) (0.114)
bureau 0.032 0.032 0.031
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
durable 0.001 0.002* 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
open -0.079 -0.02 -0.052
(0.069) (0.084) (0.086)
21.507*** 21.462*** 20.855***
(7.935) (7.171) (7.055)
-3.338*** -3.5*** -3.283***
(0.899) (0.885) (0.883)
pop2 -0.032 -0.052* -0.066**
(0.03) (0.031) (0.029)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
vatd
agedep
educind
petrolpc
urbanshare
 as does the variable of interest.  Here, a one percent increase in the C-efficiency ratio 
results in a 0.55 percent increase in per capita GDP.
Finally, the results for the gross collection efficiency ratio are reported in Table 
3.12.  Like the two other collection efficiency measures, this measure is significant across 
specification and the instrument chosen is shown to be strongly correlated with the 
variable of interest.  The results of each specification show similar magnitudes as those of 
the other measures of collection efficiency.
 Discussion
Results from the WES/WDI analysis are consistent with the direct effects outlined 
in the theoretical model.  The strongest result from these models suggests that higher 
enforcement rates, in the form of greater audit probabilities, results in lower growth.  
Firms facing a greater chance of audit must spend resources not only ensuring 
compliance in light of a potential audit, but also in dealing with the tax officials if they 
are selected for audit.  
The empirical effect of evasion costs, as proxied by tax official corruption, is in 
line with the direct theoretical effect.  More prevalent corruption not only reduces the 
costs of evasion, but is also indicative of a weak tax administration.  Weak tax 
administrations are unable to enforce tax laws even when audit and penalty rates are high. 
The need to spend resources on hiding income and evading taxes is reduced when the tax 
administration is unlikely to find the evasion in the first place.  The resources not needed 
to hide income can be used in productive pursuits, thus increasing GDP.  While these
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 Table 3.10: Tax Gap Analysis Results – VAT Efficiency
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FE-No Controls FE IV-FE
VARIABLES
0.163** 0.113*** 0.69***
(0.065) (0.041) (0.181)
0.307** -0.031
(0.130) (0.145)
tmorale1 0.449*** 0.478***
(0.131) (0.092)
-1.876*** -1.204***
(0.414) (0.317)
0.275 -0.446
(0.576) (0.393)
developed -0.037 0.378***
(0.036) (0.145)
bureau 0.003 -0.012
(0.021) (0.018)
durable 0.006** 0.005***
(0.003) (0.001)
open 0.219*** 0.257***
(0.056) (0.056)
7.007** -4.958
(2.936) (5.312)
2.269*** 4.146***
(0.572) (0.783)
pop2 -0.061* -0.041*
(0.033) (0.024)
Constant -5.969*** -6.904***
(0.227) (0.698)
Observations 1067 645 645
R-squared 0.050 0.752 0.625
Number of id 86 52 52
First Stage Statistics
F-Statistic 19.38***
17.50***
19.78***
Weak Identification – Wald Statistic 19.383
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
lngdp lngdp lngdp
lnve
vatd
agedep
educind
petrolpc
urbanshare
Underidentification LM Statistic
Underidentification Wald Statistic
  direct effects seem to be clear, the overall effect on growth of these parameters is 
ambiguous.  The indirect effects of these parameters on growth, as for example through 
their effect on public spending, can not be examined by these specifications.  Instead, a 
broader measure of enforcement and collections must be used at the expense of precision 
in measuring evasion.
A clearer picture of the overall effect of these parameters can be gained from 
examining tax collection efficiency.  Collection efficiency measures are less precise 
because they capture a number of other factors besides enforcement activity, such as tax 
structures peculiarities.  Though not all variation in collection efficiency can be attributed 
to evasion, collection efficiency still encompasses most aspects of tax collection and 
evasion, and measures the end result of the interaction of all the parameters.  When tax 
collections fall short, economic growth suffers, indicating that while the direct effect of 
audit probabilities and evasion costs are negative, these direct effects are overwhelmed by 
the indirect effects and interactions with other factors not present in the theoretical model. 
The variables dealing with audit probabilities and evasion costs measure factors 
affecting intentional evasion.  However, since intentional evasion is only a fraction of the 
tax shortfall, the effect of these factors on growth is correspondingly small.  Other factors 
affecting tax collection efficiency are possibly more important to economic growth than 
simple tax evasion.  While the theoretical model incorporating intentional evasion into 
growth theory is valid, it is incomplete.  A more comprehensive model would account for 
other potential factors affecting tax shortfalls and their effect on growth.
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 Table 3.11: Tax Gap Analysis Results – C-Efficiency
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FE-No Controls FE IV-FE
VARIABLES
0.207*** 0.124*** 0.555***
(0.066) (0.040) (0.199)
0.285** -0.021
(0.128) (0.159)
tmorale1 0.442*** 0.441***
(0.128) (0.079)
-1.783*** -1.005**
(0.420) (0.41)
0.306 -0.075
(0.571) (0.329)
developed -0.029 0.281*
(0.035) (0.154)
bureau 0.002 -0.01
(0.021) (0.016)
durable 0.006** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.001)
open 0.214*** 0.223***
(0.056) (0.052)
6.731** -2.359
(2.806) (5.127)
2.335*** 3.842***
(0.570) (0.81)
pop2 -0.059* -0.037*
(0.033) (0.022)
Constant -6.148*** -7.072***
(0.245) (0.714)
Observations 1023 645 645
R-squared 0.088 0.757 0.539
Number of id 82 52 52
First Stage Statistics
F-Statistic 10.45***
10.41***
10.66***
Weak Identification – Wald Statistic 10.445
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
lngdp lngdp lngdp
lnce
vatd
agedep
educind
petrolpc
urbanshare
Underidentification LM Statistic
Underidentification Wald Statistic
 Table 3.12: Tax Gap Analysis Results – Gross Collection Efficiency
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FE-No Controls FE IV-FE
VARIABLES
0.196*** 0.117*** 0.643***
(0.061) (0.039) (0.199)
0.295** -0.058
(0.128) (0.158)
tmorale1 0.445*** 0.455***
(0.130) (0.088)
-1.782*** -0.768*
(0.421) (0.44)
0.297 -0.236
(0.568) (0.347)
developed -0.035 0.341**
(0.035) (0.156)
bureau 0.003 -0.01
(0.021) (0.017)
durable 0.006** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.001)
open 0.217*** 0.243***
(0.056) (0.06)
2.277*** 3.967***
(0.565) (0.808)
pop2 -0.058* -0.023
(0.033) (0.023)
Constant -6.180*** -7.046***
(0.240) (0.710)
Observations 1067 645 645
R-squared 0.088 0.755 0.3784
Number of id 86 52 52
First Stage Statistics
F-Statistic 13.06***
12.726***
13.33***
Weak Identification – Wald Statistic 13.056
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
lngdp lngdp lngdp
lngc
vatd
agedep
educind
urbanshare
Underidentification LM Statistic
Underidentification Wald Statistic
 Conclusions
Tax evasion and tax collection shortfalls are theoretically related to growth in a 
number of ways.  However, the relationship between tax collections and growth is 
ambiguous.  Resources that are not collected by the government through taxation can be 
used in productive private pursuits.  However, the same resources that are not collected 
will not be used in productive public pursuits.  The effect on growth is determined by 
which use, public or private, has the greatest return.  While a great deal of work has been 
done on the determinants of economic growth, little of it has focused on tax collection 
levels. 
To examine this issue, two separate approaches are used.  The first uses 
aggregated firm level data on tax enforcement and evasion combined with country level 
data to test predictions generated by a theoretical growth model incorporating tax 
evasion.  In general, the testable theoretical predictions were found to be valid, giving 
evidence that the model as a whole is valid.  These results prove to be robust across a 
large number of regression specifications of a variety of control variables regularly 
associated with economic growth.  Further, these results were replicable with an 
alternative data set that measured the same factors in different ways and covered a 
different sample of countries.  However, the available data only offers a partial 
examination of the effects of evasion on growth.
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 The second approach involved using a panel of countries over a number of years 
to examine the overall interaction of factors from the theoretical model.  Tax collection 
shortfalls are consistently found to reduce economic growth across a number of 
specifications and estimators.  These results indicate that a variety of indirect effects or 
other factors outweigh the direct effects observed in the first approach using firm level 
data.
The results of these two analyses indicate that the return to public investment is 
likely higher in the sample countries.  As a result, policy makers should attempt to fully 
maximize revenue collections.  However, the manner in which this is accomplished is 
important as the results indicate that misplaced tax reform efforts could result in negative 
impacts on growth.  Approaches that increase compliance levels while reducing the level 
of resources needed for tax compliance are preferred to approaches that seek increased 
compliance through methods that necessitate increased resources devoted to tax 
compliance.
While this study offers some evidence on the effect of tax compliance on 
economic growth, it is not definitive.  The theoretical model of growth incorporating tax 
compliance has additional aspects and predictions that can not be tested with this data.  
Additional data and other measures of the model's parameters will provide a more 
accurate picture of the effects of compliance on growth.  However, this study does 
indicate that this theoretical model is a valid starting point for this line of inquiry.
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 Chapter 4: Corruption and Tax Evasion
Introduction
Corruption and tax evasion are not new problems, and both are still significant 
problems facing today's economies.  While these issues are distinct and can exist without 
each other, they can easily become intertwined, possibly exacerbating the effects of both 
problems.  While a large body of work on each subject separately has been developed, the 
relationship between the two problems has remained a relatively unexplored area.  
The theoretical effects of corruption on an economy are mixed.  Some have taken 
the view that corruption “greases the wheels” of commerce, or that bribers grow into 
entrepreneurs who spur development (Bardhan 1997, Leys 1965).  Conversely, the more 
intuitive view of corruption is that it creates serious inefficiencies in the economy, 
resulting in a wide range of adverse effects (Shleifer and Vishny 1993).  The subsequent 
empirical work supports the latter view of corruption, confirming that it can result lower 
growth and investment (Goodspeed and Martinez-Vazquez 2011, Mauro 1995).  
One potential channel for corruption's effect is through the reduction in 
government revenue from lower tax receipts.  In corrupt societies, individuals wishing to 
evade taxes simply bribe their tax collector and the revenue goes at least partially 
uncollected.  Particularly in cash-strapped developing nations, the resulting shortfall in 
revenue can seriously affect the government's ability to deliver public goods, such as 
education or health, that have been shown to increase growth.
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 The magnitude of these lost revenues can be substantial.  From 1989 to 1999, the 
VAT tax gap in Chile averaged approximately 23%.  With a Transparency International 
corruption perception index score of 7.2 (higher values indicate less corruption), Chile is 
viewed as a relatively uncorrupted country.  In contrast, the VAT tax gap for Argentina, a 
country with a corruption perception index score of 2.9, has been estimated averaging 
over 55% of potential revenue during the same period.    This shortfall in revenue 
represented nearly 3.5% of Argentine GDP (Bergman 2003).  While it is clear that an 
uncorrupted government can still suffer tax evasion, higher corruption levels may 
exacerbate the problem. 
Beyond the shortfall in government revenue and the subsequent underfunding of 
public goods, tax evasion also increases excess burden and reduces equity in the tax 
system.  In the context of tax evasion, excess burden can be defined as the dollar value of 
the difference between the expected utility of paying taxes with certainty and the 
expected utility from facing the enforcement “lottery” (Yitzhaki 1987).  Higher levels of 
evasion result in higher levels of excess burden due to risk aversion.  Since enforcement 
requires real resources, there is an efficient level of evasion.  However, in societies in 
which evasion is rampant, it seems likely that this efficient level is often exceeded.  
Further, Hindriks et al. (1999) demonstrate that bribery to evade taxes is done by 
the middle of the income distribution, as the poor do not have enough to gain from 
evasion and the rich are insulated by their income levels.  The bribe effectively becomes 
a surcharge added to the statutory tax schedule that decreases with income.  As a result 
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 more of the effective tax burden is then borne by lower incomes, reducing progressivity 
and increasing inequity.
Like the theoretical predictions for corruption in general, corruption with respect 
to tax evasion has been argued to have negative as well as positive effects.  Corruption 
could increase tax revenue through the increased efforts of corrupt tax collectors 
(Mookherjee 1997).  In order to maximize the number of bribes, inspectors have an 
incentive to work harder, increasing the probability a tax evader will be caught.  Since the 
standard tax evasion decision model is decreasing in probability of being caught, fewer 
people will engage in evasion, resulting in higher revenues and more public goods than in 
a non-corrupt society.
While a good deal of theoretical work has focused on the relationship between 
corruption and tax evasion, empirical research on the firm's evasion decision is sparse.   
This study seeks to add to this literature by empirically investigating whether corruption 
leads to greater levels of tax evasion at the micro level.  Using extensive firm level data 
gathered by the World Bank over several countries and years, this study will employ a 
propensity score matching technique in addition to standard econometric methods to 
provide a robust answer to the research question.
Literature Review
Chander and Wilde (1992) develop an early theoretical model of tax evasion that 
incorporates corruption.  Following the work of Graetz et al.  (1986), the authors adopt a 
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 game-theoretic approach to tax evasion.  From this framework, the authors find that, in 
the presence of corruption, increases in fine and tax rates can reduce government revenue 
through increased evasion.
More generally, theoretical work has addressed some aspects of the interplay 
between corruption and the tax system.  These findings include additional evidence for a 
Laffer curve effect under a corrupt tax collection regime in which increased tax collection 
effort in the form of increased audits or tax rates serve to reduce government revenue 
(Sanyal, Gang and Goswami 2000); that the optimal tax structure in a corrupt society 
should be heavily tilted toward on consumption taxes (Barreto and Alm 2003); and that 
governments may be better off heavily monitoring corrupt collection agents (Besley and 
McLaren 1993) or even allowing a moderate degree of corruption (Flatters and Macleod 
1995) than attempting to pay them an efficiency wage.
The more traditional expected utility framework of tax evasion first introduced by 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) has also been extended to examine the relationship 
between corruption and evasion.  Theoretical results from this line of work include 
findings that bribes, when sufficiently large, can act as deterrents to evasion, inducing the 
taxpayer to pay their taxes (Akdede 2006);  that increases in the fine rate for corruption, 
while reducing corruption, can lead to increases in evasion, as taxpayers no longer face 
bribery costs of evasion  (Acconcia, D'Amato and Martina 2003); and that increases in 
tax audit probabilities and fines are more effective than increasing investigations of 
corruption in reducing tax evasion (Bowles 1999).
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 Combining the Allingham and Sandmo model with a Ramsey growth model, 
Cerqueti and Coppier (2010) approach the relationship between corruption and evasion at 
a macroeconomic level.  Further, the authors also allow for the interplay of tax morale 
with the corruption and evasion decision.  While finding ambiguous effects on growth, 
the model produces unambiguous theoretical result that higher levels of corruption lead to 
lower tax revenues, particularly when tax morale is low.
While a good deal of the theoretical literature examines the effects of corruption 
on taxes and evasion, Goerke (2008) examines the firm's corruption decision in the 
presence of tax evasion.  Focusing on the firm's corruption activities not related to 
evasion, Goerke finds that tax evasion has no direct bearing on the firm's bribery 
decision.  However, changes in other exogenous factors, such as the bribe rate and tax 
rates, introduce ambiguity into the relationship such that corruption may have an impact 
on evasion.  
The empirical work on the relationship between evasion and corruption is not as 
developed as the theoretical literature on the subject.  Attilla (2008) examines the effects 
of corruption on growth through a tax revenue channel.   This study finds that a 
combination of high levels of corruption and public revenue reduce growth, which is 
consistent with a detrimental effect of corruption on taxes.  As corruption decreases tax 
revenue, governments can respond by increasing tax burdens to compensate, leading to 
more distortionary effects and lower growth. 
Several other studies have focused on the increase in the underground economy 
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 due to the presence of corruption.  While this increase in the underground economy 
implies an increase in tax non-compliance, corruption, not the desire to evade, may be the 
driving force (Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton 1999).  In other words, 
in highly corrupt economies, firms don't go underground to avoid higher statutory tax 
rates, but instead to avoid the higher effective tax that is associated with corruption and 
bribery.  
Correspondingly, other studies have confirmed a positive association between 
corruption and the underground economy and a negative association between corruption 
and tax revenue (Brasoveanu and Obreja Brasoveanu 2009, Ghura 2002, Johnson and 
Kaufmann 1999, Tanzi and Davoodi 2001, Tanzi and Davoodi 1997).  Other channels by 
which corruption reduces tax revenue is through its effect on tax morale.  Corruption has 
been demonstrated to lower tax morale which is associated with lower tax compliance 
(Torgler 2004).
While these studies examine the effects of corruption on tax revenue at an 
aggregate level, much less work has focused on the actual relationship between 
corruption and the tax evasion decision.  Some evidence has been presented of shared 
perceptions of corruption and evasion, which implies a close relationship, but does not 
directly address the interaction of the two (Torgler and Valev 2006).  
Most similar to this work, Uslaner (2007) uses a subset of the data used in this 
thesis to focus on the relationship between corruption and evasion in transition countries 
in 2002 and 2005.  While Uslaner argues that evasion is primarily driven by the 
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 perception of government effectiveness, he notes that one of the primary drivers of that 
perception is the level of corruption in a country.  If taxpayers believe their payments will 
simply be appropriated by corrupt officials rather than used for public goods, they will 
not pay their taxes.  Correspondingly, he finds corruption to be an important factor that 
negatively affects the decision to pay taxes.
The theoretical work on corruption and evasion mainly deals with efficient 
responses to evasion in the presence of corruption.  However, the work dealing with the 
effects of corruption on evasion are somewhat mixed.  Models using the rational crime 
model indicate that in some circumstances corruption depresses evasion.  Models 
focusing on tax revenue and corruption show that revenues are adversely affected, 
indicating potentially larger amounts of evasion.
The empirical evidence is less ambiguous.  In line with theoretical models of tax 
revenue, corruption has been consistently shown to reduce tax revenues through a variety 
of channels in aggregate models.  While less work has been done at the micro level, the 
negative effects of corruption on tax compliance seems to persist at less aggregated 
levels, contrary to some implications of theoretical models of the tax compliance 
decision.  This study address this discrepancy and extends the micro-level empirical work 
on corruption and evasion by developing a model of the taxpayer's evasion decision and 
testing that model with a more extensive set of data and methods than has been used 
previously.
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 Theoretical Approach
This theoretical model focuses on the firm's decision to pay or evade taxes.  Firms 
earn a total income of Y, of which they either declare to the authorities, D, or attempt to 
hide, E.
Y=D+E (1)
In the traditional tax evasion model developed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), agents 
face a risky gamble based on the probability of being audited by the authorities.  If they 
are not audited, they receive and income of:
I NA=Y−τD−h0(Y−D)
2 (2)
where τ is the tax rate on income declared, and h0 is the costs of evasion such as keeping 
two sets of book or hiring lawyers or accountants to help hide income.  Costs are 
increasing exponentially in the amount of money being hidden as larger hidden sums 
require more resources; holding cash in Swiss bank accounts is far more expensive than 
hiding it under a mattress.  In a non-corrupt society, if the firm is audited, then it is fined 
and the resulting income is:
I AS=Y−τ D−π τ (Y−D)−h0(Y−D)
2 (3)
where the firm must pay both taxes at the tax rate of τ, and a fine at the fine rate of π one 
the evaded income.  Unfortunately for the firm, the resources used in hiding the income 
are still lost even in the event that the subterfuge is not successful.
In an economy with corruption, the firms face the probability of being audited by 
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 a non-corrupt, or straight, official or by a corrupt official willing to take a bribe to enable 
their evasion.  A corrupt official and bribery will result in a final income of:
I AC=Y−τD−B− f (B)h0(Y−D)
2 (4)
∂ f (B)
∂B
< 0 , f (B)∈[0,1]
Where B is the bribe paid to the official and f(B) is the factor by which bribing the 
official reduces costs of hiding income.  This factor is decreasing in B, as larger bribes 
should buy bigger reductions in the costs of evasion.  Defining B and f(B) and 
substituting into (4) gives:
B=θπτ(Y−D) (5)
θ∈[0,1]
f (B)=(1−θ)α (6)
I AC=Y−τD−θπ τ(Y−D)−(1−θ)
α h0(Y−D)
2 (4a )
Following Besley and McLaren (1993), θ is the fraction of the tax and fine liability paid 
as a bribe and represents the tax inspector's bargaining power.  The benefit of bribery, 
f(B) is assumed to be dependent on this bargaining power and is adjusted by α, which 
represents the effectiveness of the corrupt official in reducing costs.  This parameter can 
encompasses a wide range of factors including the level of enforcement of anti-corruption 
laws, the general level of corruption in a country, or even firm specific circumstances1.  In 
a very corrupt country, the bribe may be sufficient to fully eliminate evasion costs; the 
1 For example, a U.S. multinational company operating in a corrupt environment may engage in bribery 
to avoid local taxes, but would still need to use additional resources to circumvent U.S. laws against 
corruption, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  In this case, the corrupt tax official's 
effectiveness in abetting evasion is limited to only what he can do in his country. 
120
 corrupt official takes the bribe and ignores the taxpayer.  In a more honest or vigilant 
society, the corrupt official may be able to mitigate the evasion costs, but the taxpayer 
must still incur some costs in order to completely hide the evasion.  
The three potential income levels can be placed in an expected utility framework:
E (U )=qpU ( I AC)+ (1−q) pU ( I AS )+ (1−p)U ( I NA) (7)
where p is the probability of being audited and q is the probability of being audited by a 
corrupt tax inspector.  The firm's problem is to maximize expected utility by deciding 
what amount of income to declare.  Substituting the appropriate equations and 
maximizing (7) with respect to D results in:
∂ E(U )
∂D
=qp ∂U
∂ I AC
∂ I AC
∂ D
+ (1−q) p ∂U
∂ I AS
∂ I AS
∂D
+ (1− p) ∂U
∂ I NA
∂ I NA
∂ D
=
ϕ=qp ∂U
∂ I AC
[π τθ−τ+ 2h0(Y−D)(1−θ)
α]+ (1−q) p ∂U
∂ I AS
[π τ−τ+ 2h0(Y−D)]
+ (1−p) ∂U
∂ I NA
[2h0(Y−D)−τ ]=0 (8)
 
The second derivative of ϕ with respect to D is less than zero, indicating the F.O.C is a 
maximum.  
∂ϕ
∂D
=qp ∂
2U
∂ I AC
2 [π τθ−τ+2h0(Y−D)(1−θ)
α]2+ pq ∂U
∂ I AC
(−2h0(1−θ)
α)
+(1−q) p ∂
2U
∂ I As
2 (τ πθ−τ+2h0(Y−D))
2+(1−q) p ∂U
∂ I AS
(−2h0)
+(1− p) ∂
2 U
∂ I NA
2 [2h0(Y−D)−τ ]
2+(1−p) ∂U
∂ I NA
(−2h0)<0 (9)
Correspondingly, the optimal amount of declared income can be defined as:
D*=D(τ ,π , p , q ,θ ,α , h0 , Y ) (10)
121
 Equation (8) also implicitly defines D as a function of the corruption variables q, α, and 
θ.  By the implicit function theorem, the comparative statics of these variables can be 
calculated.  Taking the derivative of φ with respect to each corruption variable gives:
∂ϕ
∂ q
(-)
= p ∂U
∂ I AC
[π τθ−τ+ 2ho(Y−D)(1−θ)
α]
(-)
−p ∂U
∂ I AS
[π τ−τ+ 2h0(Y−D)]
(+)
(11)
∂ϕ
∂θ
(?)
=pq (π τθ−τ+ 2h0(Y−D)(1−θ)
α) ∂
2 U
∂ I AC
2 (−π τ(Y−D)+ α(1−θ)
α−1 h0(Y−D)
2)
(?)
+ qp ∂U
∂ I AC
(−α 2 h0(Y−D)(1−θ)
α−1)
(-)
(12)
∂ϕ
∂α
(?)
= pq(π τθ−τ+ 2h0(Y−D)(1−θ)
α) ∂
2U
∂ I AC
2 (−h0(Y−D)
2 ln (1−θ)(1−θ)α)
(+)
+ pq ∂U
∂ I AC
(2h0(Y−D)ln (1−θ)(1−θ)
α)
(-)
(13)
Given that the sign of the derivative of φ with respect to q is negative and ambiguous for 
the other two corruption variables, by the implicit function theorem, the effect of changes 
in corruption on the amount of declared income will also be negative with respect to the 
probability of being audited by a corrupt tax official and ambiguous with respect to the 
bribe level and effectiveness:
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 ∂ D
∂q
=−
ϕq
ϕD=−
(-)
(-)
(14)
∂D
∂θ =−
ϕθ
ϕD =−
(?)
(-)
(15)
∂D
∂α =−
ϕα
ϕD=−
(?)
(-) (16)
Income from a crooked audit will always exceed that of a straight audit.  Should a 
corrupt tax inspector attempt to extort an amount greater than the tax and fines on the 
evaded amount, the taxpayer could simply approach a straight tax inspector and pay the 
full tax and fine owed.  As a result, the bribe rate plus the reduced evasion costs 
associated with the bribe will always be less than the fine/tax rate on evaded income plus 
the full costs of evasion.  In this respect, businesses will always prefer to be audited by a 
crooked auditor and decrease their reported income as the probability of audit by a 
corrupt auditor increases.
The auditor's bargaining power and bribery effectiveness have more ambiguous 
results on declared income.  These two variables serve to change the price of tax evasion, 
with larger bribes and more effective bribes, as represented by higher values of θ and α 
respectively, reducing the costs of tax evasion.  As the size of the bribe grows, the change 
in price of tax evasion has an income and substitution effect on the amount of income 
declared.  
The income effect is represented by the first term of equation (12).  As disposable 
income grows due to the lower costs of evasion from the larger bribe, declared income 
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 will also increase.  Declaring more income creates more certainty, thus declared income 
is a normal good.  However, while the increase in income from falling costs of evasion 
are positive, the bribe must be paid to the corrupt authority.  Paying the bribe offsets the 
income gains from the cost of evasion reduction and thereby reduces the amount of 
declared income.  These two countervailing effects serve to create ambiguity with regard 
to the overall effect of the bribe rate on declared income.
The substitution effect from the relative price change between declared and 
undeclared income due to the bribe size is represented by the second term of equation 
(12).  As the costs of evasion fall, the relative price of declaring income increases.  This 
results in the substitution of evaded income for declared income as indicated by the 
negative sign of the substitution effect.  Given the ambiguity of the income effect and the 
impossibility of determining which effect dominates, the total effect of changing the bribe 
size on declared income is theoretically ambiguous.
Similarly, changes in α also result in change in the costs of evasion, with higher 
values resulting in lower evasion costs.  The more effective a corrupt official is at 
reducing the costs, the lower the costs will be.  The resulting change in declared income 
is also subject to income and substitution effects.  Unlike a change in the bribe size, 
increasing official effectiveness only creates a decrease in the costs of evasion, which 
results in higher income.  Because the firm receives all the benefit from this income 
increase, the effect on declared income is unambiguously positive.  As noted above, 
declared income is normal, thus the resulting increase in income will reduce tax evasion.
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 Counterbalancing this effect is a substitution effect that is similar to the 
substitution effect arising from an increase in the bribe.  Like larger bribes, more effective 
corruption will reduce the costs of evasion.  Correspondingly, the relative price of 
declaring income will increase and firms will substitute away from declared income to 
undeclared income.  Again, it is impossible to determine which effect will dominate, so 
the overall effect of an increase in α on declared income is theoretically ambiguous.
Estimation Approach and Econometric Issues
Due to data limitations, not all parameters affecting the optimal level of income 
reporting in equation (10) can be explicitly included in the econometric specification.  
Measures of the tax rate, τ, and penalty rate, π, are not available.  However, as these are 
constant at the country level, a vector of country fixed effects will control for them.  
Similarly, the data does not have good measures for evasion costs other than the 
corruption variables.  Since corruption is the main focus of this analysis, they can not be 
used as a proxy for evasion costs.  These shortcomings in this data set offers room for 
further research.  The other factors affecting the firm's reporting decision are represented 
in the data set and are discussed below.
Following from equation (10), the main econometric specification for this study 
is:
rprt _ salesi=β0+β1 brib _ taxesi+β2 brsal _ peri+β3brsal i
2
+β4tax _ inspeci+β5obst _ taxreg i+β6 obst _ hightax i+β7 ln (sales)i+βn X i+u (17)
125
 where rprt_sales is the percentage of sales a firm declares for tax purposes, brib_taxes is 
a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has made a bribe to deal with taxes, brsal_per 
is the firm's total bribery payments for tax and other purposes as a percentage of sales, 
brsal2 is the square of brsal_per, tax_inspec is a dummy variable indicating that the firm 
has been audited within the past year, obst_taxreg and obst_hightax are categorical 
variables measuring how much the firm views tax regulations and rates as an obstacle to 
doing business and ln(sales) is the natural log of the firm's sales.  The vector X contains 
control variables, including country fixed effects which also control for the tax and 
penalty rate faced by the firm as these are assumed to be invariant within a country.
The two estimates of interest are β1, and β2.  The variable brib_taxes measures the 
firm's probability of facing a corrupt tax inspector, and thus represents the q variable from 
equation (10).  While measuring a firm's entire bribery load, brsal_per and brsal2 capture 
information on the amount of the bribe for tax evasion, and thus is a measure of θ.  
Finally, while the effectiveness of tax officials in reducing costs, α, is not specifically 
controlled for in this specification, the country level fixed effects included in the X vector 
will offer some control for this effect.  
The effectiveness of officials in reducing evasion costs depends on how 
acceptable corruption is in the country.  As corruption becomes more common and 
presumably more acceptable, it becomes more effective at reducing costs associated with 
evasion.  For example, a firm engaged in evasion may keep two sets of books.  Upon 
being audited by a corrupt auditor, the firm can then bribe the auditor to report the cooked 
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 books to his superiors, thus enabling the evasion.  In a society in which corruption is 
more common, the corrupt auditor's superiors could simply accept the auditor's word that 
the firm's books are straight, particularly if the superiors gain something from the 
transaction as well2.  This obviates the need for two sets of books; the auditor's 
(corrupted) word stands in for the cooked books. Each country has its own level of 
corruption acceptance and the country fixed effects capture this acceptance level.
The amount of tax evasion in which a firm engages may affect the level of 
corruption in which they must also participate.  Some theoretical work has focused on the 
incentives faced by the tax inspectors to accept bribes and notes that the tax evasion by 
firms and corruption by inspectors are complementary activities (Çule and Fulton 2005).  
While corruption may induce more firms to cheat on taxes, more cheating on taxes 
creates more opportunities for bribery of tax officials.  This potential endogeneity may 
bias the estimates on the corruption variables and must be addressed. 
This study first deals with the potential endogeneity by employing an instrumental 
variable approach.  An appropriate instrument for the corruption variables is one that is 
correlated with corruption but uncorrelated with tax evasion.  One such set of variables 
that meets these requirements is the information regarding the firm's other bribery 
activity.  Such variables available include if a firm bribed authorities to get connected to 
infrastructure, to obtain a business license, and to obtain a government contract.  
2 A recent case in India illustrates the potential collusion between corrupt tax officials and their superiors. 
In his defense, a corrupt tax official claimed that the bribe “accepted by him was to be passed on to his 
senior Nahar and was not for his use only” (PTI 2013).
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 As corruption takes root in a society, these types of bribes will grow in 
conjunction with bribery of tax officials to evade taxes.  A culture of bribery reduces the 
stigma and social costs involved with all forms of bribery.  Further, if a firm is 
comfortable with bribing for other reasons,  then it is unlikely to view tax bribery as 
unacceptable and refuse to engage in it.  As a result, the other bribe variables meet the 
first condition for instrumental variables; they are correlated with bribery to deal with 
taxes.  
 Since the bribery activity captured by the instrumental variables does not affect 
the firm's relationship with the tax authorities, it is independent of the tax evasion 
decision (Goerke 2008).  In a sense, these bribes can be viewed as a cost of doing 
business similar to the wage rate or cost of capital.  While such costs affect total income 
and profits, they do not affect the amount of sales to report for tax purposes.  As a result, 
these instruments also meet the second condition of instrumental variables.  Further, 
given three instruments, bribery to deal with infrastructure, business licenses and 
government contracts, and only one endogenous variable, the equation is over-identified, 
which allows for testing of both instrumental variable conditions.
The dependent variable also presents estimation issues for least squares 
estimation.  The percentage of sales reported for tax purposes is bounded between 0 and 
100, with a large proportion (55%) of the sample reporting 100 percent of sales.  The 
transformation from a continuous distribution, the actual amount of sales reported for tax 
purposes, to a limited distribution, the percentage of sales reported, creates issues for 
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 conventional regression methods (Green 2003).  In the context of this data, an 
instrumental variable Tobit model can be used to address this issue (Alm and McClellan 
2012). 
Endogeneity of the corruption variable can also be addressed through propensity 
score matching (DiPrete and Gangl 2004).  Propensity score matching has the added 
benefit of not imposing a functional form on the data.  The event of facing and bribing a 
corrupt tax collector can be viewed as a random treatment that the firm experiences, with 
the subsequent outcome being the amount of sales that are reported for tax purposes.  The 
effect of corruption on tax evasion can be determined by finding the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT).  The effect of the treatment on the outcome is observable on 
the treated firms and the effect of non-treatment on the outcome is visible for non-treated 
firms.  Denoting declared income Y1 for treated firms and Y0 for non-treated firms the 
average treatment effect (ATE) can be written:
ATE=E (Y 1 |C=1−Y 0 |C=0) (18)
where E is the expectations operator and C is a dummy variable indicating if the firm 
faced corruption or not.  However, due to potential endogeneities, the ATE will not be the 
same as the ATT.  The ATT is determined by:
ATT=E (Y 1 |C=1−Y 0 |C=1)=E(Y 1−Y 0 |C=1) (19)
Thus finding the ATT requires observation of the outcomes of the untreated when they 
are treated (Y0|C=1), an observation that is impossible to make.  Because the treatment is 
not necessarily completely random, it is necessary to employ propensity score matching 
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 to establish a control group for comparison with the treated group.  A well specified 
propensity score model will capture most of the issues arising from the non-random 
nature of the treatment.  The propensity score model first identifies the characteristics that 
are highly associated with treatment.  Based on those characteristics, firms that have a 
high probability to be treated but in actuality were not are established as a control group 
with which the treated group can be compared.  From this group, the ATT can be 
measured, giving the effect of corruption on tax evasion.
Since the treatment is partially based on the firm's actions of engaging in bribery, 
it is important to control for a wide range of firm characteristics to account for this 
potential selection bias.  For this analysis, a number of observable firm characteristics, 
including firm size in sales and employees, ownership and industry type,  attitude toward 
taxes, and other bribery activities are used to identify the untreated firms that would have 
been likely to fall into the treated group in order to establish a control group.  Since the 
firm's other bribery activity is an observable and captures the firm's attitudes toward 
corruption, the potential selection bias is mitigated.  Once this is accounted for, the 
treatment contains a random element as bribing to deal with taxes can only occur if the 
firm has the chance to be audited by a corrupt official. The treatment is if a bribe was 
paid to deal with taxes and a probit regression gives the propensity that a firm engages in 
bribery based on the observable characteristics.  After obtaining the fitted values from the 
probit regression, firms within the control group will be matched with firms in the treated 
group based on their propensity scores.  The resulting average difference in outcomes is 
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 the effect of bribing to deal with taxes on tax evasion.
In matching propensity scores, there is a tradeoff between efficiency and bias 
depending on what matching method is used for finite samples (Caliendo and Kopeinig 
2008).  To address this tradeoff, this study uses three matching techniques: Nearest 
Neighbor, Gaussian Kernel, and Epanechikov Kernel.  Nearest Neighbor matching pairs 
observations based on which propensity scores are closest to one another.  The similarity 
of the propensity scores between treated and non-treated observations reduce bias in the 
comparison, however the one-to-one comparison reduces the number of matches between 
groups which increases the variance.  Kernel matching addresses this issue by using a 
weighted average of all control group observations to create a counterfactual for the 
treatment observation.  Since all control group observations are used, the variance of the 
estimate is reduced.  However, this method can introduce bias as bad matches may be 
used in the weighting scheme.
Data
The data for this study comes from a compilation of survey data from the World 
Bank.  Through the first decade of the millennium, the World Bank conducted the World 
Enterprise Survey (WES) and Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS), polls of individual firms regarding their business environment.  The survey 
questions of interest cover over 16,000 firms from 33 different countries.  Due to missing 
data, sample sizes for richer specifications are closer to 8,000 observations. A description 
of variables used can be found in Table 4.1 and summary statistics in Table 4.2.
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 Table 4.1: Variable Descriptions
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Variable Description
Percentage of sales reported for tax purposes
Bribed to deal with taxes dummy
brsal2
Inspected by tax authorities in past year dummy
Natural log of sales
Full time permanent employment
Mining Mining industry dummy
Construction  Construction industry dummy
Transport/communication  Transport/communication industry dummy
Trade  Trade industry dummy
Business services  Business services industry dummy
Hotels/restaurants  Hotels/restaurants industry dummy
Other service  Other service industry dummy
rprt_sales
brib_taxes
brsal_per Total briberyas percentage of sales
brib_tax^2
tax_inspec
obst_taxreg
Tax regulations are an obstacle to business (0-No 
Obstacle, 3-Major Obstacle)
obst_hightax
Tax rates are an obstacle to business (0-No Obstacle, 3-
Major Obstacle)
lnsales
obst_corrup
Corruption is an obstacle to business (0-No Obstacle, 3-
Major Obstacle)
empfull
MF-Food  MF-Food industry dummy
MF-Textile  MF-Textile industry dummy
MF-Garments  MF-Garments industry dummy
MF-Chemicals  MF-Chemicals industry dummy
MF-Plastics and rubber  MF-Plastics and rubber industry dummy
MF-Non-metallic mineral products MF-Non-metallic mineral products industry dummy
MF-Metals and metal products MF-Metals and metal products industry dummy
MF-Machinery and equip.  MF-Machinery and equip. industry dummy
MF-Electronics  MF-Electronics industry dummy
MF-n.e.c  MF-n.e.c industry dummy
 Table 4.1 cnt.: Variable Descriptions
The dependent variable follows from a question asking firms what the typical firm 
in their area reports for tax purposes.  Asking a firm directly about tax evasion is likely to 
result in evasive responses, as respondents are often wary of incriminating themselves or 
wish to present themselves in a positive light (Elffers, Weigel and Hessing 1987).  
Indirect survey questions seek to limit this misreporting by asking about the behavior of 
others.  The respondent's answer is assumed to be informed by their own experiences and 
thus a reasonable proxy for their own behavior.  While the indirect questions mitigate 
misreporting due to self-presentation reasons, it is still subject to misreporting due to 
firm's misapprehension of its own behavior.  If the firm does not realize it is engaging in 
tax evasion, then it can not report its experience with tax evasion.  However, the lack of 
formal high-quality audit data often makes this type of survey data the only way to 
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Variable Description
Listed Legal organization – Listed 
Closed Legal organization – Closed 
Sole Prop. Legal organization – Sole Proprietorship 
Partnership Legal organization – Partnership 
Public Sector Legal organization – Public Sector 
Other Legal organization – Other 
Domestic Private Ownership – Domestic Private
Foreign Private Ownership  - Foreign Private
State Ownership  - State
Bribed to deal with infrastructure dummy
Bribed to deal with licenses dummy
Bribed to deal with contracts dummy
brib_infra
brib_license
brib_contr
 proceed in investigating tax evasion.
The dummy variable taxinspect controls for the audit probabilities faced by the 
firm.  While this variable is most likely endogenous to tax evasion (Alm, Cronshaw and 
McKee 1993), since it is not the primary focus of investigation, the biases generated by 
this endogeneity do not affect the conclusions regarding the impact of corruption on tax 
evasion (Stock 2010).  Indeed, by allowing the endogeneity, this variable potentially 
controls for other omitted variables that are correlated with both corruption and audit 
activities.  
The two final factors in the theoretical model, firm income and costs of evasion, 
are represented in the empirical model by the natural log of sales and the firm's view of 
taxes being an obstacle to doing business.  The firm's sales is a direct measure of Y in the 
theoretical model.  While it does not measure evasion costs directly, the firm's view of 
taxes as an obstacle to business contains some information about these costs.  First, the 
firm's evasion costs consists of pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs.  Some pecuniary costs 
typically associated with evasion are the salaries to the CPAs and lawyers enabling 
evasion or the bank fees accompanying an account in which gains can be hidden. 
Non-pecuniary, or psychological, costs arise from the social stigma of tax evasion 
or the possible embarrassment of being caught.  Both these costs can contribute to a firm 
viewing taxes as an obstacle to business.  When a firm faces low costs, it is easier to 
evade taxes.  When taxes are easy and cheap to evade, they do not pose a large obstacle to 
doing business.  A firm will simply evade the taxes it needs to evade and move on with 
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 business3.  However, when costs of evasion are high and evasion does not come as easily, 
taxes are not so lightly dismissed.  In this respect, taxes increasingly become an obstacle 
to business as evasion costs increase. 
Results
Table 4.3 reports first stage regressions for the IV analyses.  Column one shows 
estimates from the least squares first stage regression. The instruments chosen are 
positively correlated with tax corruption and significant at the 1% level.  A firm that 
bribes to deal with contracts, licenses, or infrastructure increases the likelihood a firm 
bribing to deal with taxes by between 18.8 and 28.5 percent.  Column two gives the Tobit 
first stage estimates which do not significantly differ from the least squares results.
Throughout specifications and estimation methods, corruption on the part of tax 
officials enables tax evasion.  Table 4.4 presents estimates from the main variables of the 
regression analysis, while Table 4.A1 gives results for country and year fixed effects.  
Column one of Table 4.4 gives results of a base model with no controls.  Corruption and 
tax evasion are strongly linked as all measures of corruption are statistically significant at 
the 1% level.  The addition of controls does not affect the statistical significance of these 
results.  Column two presents results with controls consistent with the parameters of the 
theoretical model while column three estimates add firm characteristics controls.
3 A similar effect has been shown to occur in the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and taxation.  High levels of corruption attenuate the relationship tax levels and FDI (Goodspeed, 
Martinez-Vazquez, and Zhang 2011)
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 Table 4.2: Summary Statistics
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    Variable Obs Mean Min Max
16231 88.164 19.918 1 100
16231 0.405 0.491 0 1
16231 1.087 2.603 0 50
brsal2 16231 7.957 44.315 0 2500
11009 0.529 0.499 0 1
15925 1.468 1.134 0 3
16047 1.685 1.122 0 3
12789 6.151 2.110 0 14.509
15444 1.060 1.138 0 3
16213 114.422 440.698 2 9960
Mining 16231 0.010 0.101 0 1
Construction 16231 0.118 0.322 0 1
Transport/communication 16231 0.070 0.255 0 1
Trade 16231 0.230 0.421 0 1
Business services 16231 0.103 0.304 0 1
Hotels/restaurants 16231 0.066 0.249 0 1
Other service 16231 0.086 0.280 0 1
16231 0.082 0.275 0 1
16231 0.019 0.136 0 1
16231 0.035 0.183 0 1
16231 0.012 0.111 0 1
16231 0.007 0.082 0 1
16231 0.013 0.114 0 1
16231 0.045 0.207 0 1
16231 0.049 0.217 0 1
16231 0.005 0.069 0 1
16231 0.051 0.219 0 1
Listed 16231 0.021 0.142 0 1
Closed 16231 0.256 0.436 0 1
Sole Prop. 16231 0.348 0.476 0 1
Partnership 16231 0.249 0.433 0 1
Public Sector 16231 0.087 0.282 0 1
Other 16231 0.039 0.193 0 1
Domestic Private 16231 0.793 0.405 0 1
Foreign Private 16231 0.121 0.326 0 1
State 16231 0.086 0.280 0 1
16044 0.250 0.433 0 1
15981 0.441 0.496 0 1
15333 0.343 0.475 0 1
Std. Dev.
rprt_sales
brib_taxes
brsal_per
tax_inspec
obst_taxreg
obst_hightax
lnsales
obst_corrup
empfull
MF-Food
MF-Textile
MF-Garments
MF-Chemicals
MF-Plastics and rubber
MF-Non-metallic mineral products
MF-Metals and metal products
MF-Machinery and equip.
MF-Electronics
MF-n.e.c
brib_infra
brib_license
brib_contr
 Table 4.3: First Stage Regression Results
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IV First Stage IV Tobit First Stage
Variables brib_taxes brib_taxes
brsal_per 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.003) (0.003)
brsal2 -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
tax_inspec 0.036*** 0.036***
(0.010) (0.010)
obst_taxreg 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.005) (0.005)
obst_hightax 0.005 0.005
(0.005) (0.005)
lnsales -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
yoper -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Closed 0.006 0.005
(0.031) (0.031)
Sole Prop. 0.013 0.013
(0.032) (0.032)
Partnership -0.011 -0.011
(0.032) (0.032)
Public Sector -0.080 -0.080
(0.060) (0.059)
Other 0.011 0.011
(0.038) (0.038)
Foreign Private -0.001 -0.001
(0.014) (0.014)
State 0.052 0.052
(0.054) (0.054)
brib_infrastr 0.198*** 0.195***
(0.014) (0.014)
brib_license 0.285*** 0.287***
(0.014) (0.014)
brib_contract 0.188*** .188***
(0.014) (0.013)
Constant 0.016 -0.037
(0.065) (0.058)
Observations 7821 7821
R-Squared 0.487
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 Table 4.4: Regression Analysis  Results
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No Controls Model Controls Extended Controls IV IV-Tobit
VARIABLES rprt_sales rprt_sales rprt_sales rprt_sales rprt_sales
brib_taxes -7.360*** -4.536*** -3.895*** -6.758*** -22.464***
(0.342) (0.410) (0.434) (0.791) (1.777)
brsal_per -1.864*** -1.584*** -1.353*** -1.226*** -2.392***
(0.177) (0.216) (0.188) (0.179) (0.312)
brsal2 0.045*** 0.043** 0.035** 0.030*** 0.058***
(0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.011) (0.017)
tax_inspec -0.288 -0.318 -0.385 -0.462
(0.343) (0.392) (0.399) (0.973)
obst_taxreg -0.296 -0.435* -0.266 -0.732
(0.224) (0.231) (0.238) (0.555)
obst_hightax -0.789*** 0.059 0.020 -0.412
(0.216) (0.223) (0.227) (0.540)
lnsales 0.853*** 0.655*** 0.651*** 1.747***
(0.075) (0.103) (0.115) (0.303)
yoper -0.000 -0.001 -0.008
(0.009) (0.008) (0.026)
Closed -1.643* -1.839* -9.532**
(0.944) (0.995) (4.044)
Sole Prop. -4.816*** -5.146*** -17.755***
(1.013) (1.051) (4.090)
Partnership -3.158*** -3.403*** -13.734***
(1.001) (1.042) (4.086)
Public Sector -6.926 0.364 124.402***
(7.623) (1.874) (7.262)
Other -0.575 -0.745 -5.900
(1.236) (1.310) (4.809)
Foreign Private 1.264** 1.507*** 5.674***
(0.530) (0.530) (1.564)
State 6.240 -0.991 -125.834***
(7.610) (1.780) (6.643)
Constant 92.816*** 89.735*** 90.244*** 92.413*** 137.397***
(0.172) (0.638) (2.828) (2.125) (6.928)
Observations 16231 8601 8292 7821 7821
R-squared 0.084 0.083 0.169 0.169 NA
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Country, Year, and Industry dummy reported in appendix table due to space considerations.
 In these specifications, tax bribery results in lower sales reporting for tax 
purposes.  A bribe is estimated to reduce reported sales by 3.9-7.4 percentage points.   
Additionally, as the amount of bribery increases so does tax evasion.  An increase of one 
percentage point in bribes as a percent of sales will decrease reported sales by between 
1.4 and 1.9 percentage points.  However, if bribery becomes too expensive, it becomes 
more advantageous to forgo bribery and pay taxes.  Thus, the relationship between 
reported sales and bribe levels is parabolic.  Once bribes reach between 18.42-20.71 
percent of sales, firms begin to reduce their tax evasion.
Table 4.5: IV Validity Statistics
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1394.12
P-value 0.0000
2796.64
P-value 0.0000
Weak identification test
924.228
Partial R-Squared 0.2985
Hansen J Statistic 1.307
Chi-sq (2) P-Value 0.5202
 First Stage  
brib_taxes
Underidentification test
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic
 Additional instrument validity statistics can be found in Table 4.5.  
Underidentification is strongly rejected with LM and Wald statistics of 1394.12 and 
2796.64 respectively.  Similarly, tax bribery is strongly identified by the instruments, with 
the estimation giving a F-statistic of 924.23.  These results indicate that the first 
instrumental variable condition of correlation between the instruments and the variable of 
interest is fulfilled.
Further, with three separate instruments, the equation is overidentified.  This 
allows for testing of the orthogonality condition as well.  These estimates produce a 
Hansen J statistic of 1.307, which fails to reject the null hypothesis of orthogonality.  
These results show that the chosen instruments are appropriate as they meet both 
conditions for valid instrumental variables.
The results of the least squares IV analysis can be found in the fourth column of 
Table 4.4.  As with the non-IV regressions, corruption is shown to be a significant factor 
in tax evasion.  Bribing to deal with taxes reduces amount of sales reported for tax 
purposes by 6.76 percentage points.  Further, larger bribes result in reductions in reported 
sales until the bribe level reaches 20.43 percent of sales.  The average VAT rate for the 
countries in the sample is 18 percent, and firms steadily increase the average level of 
bribery as a percentage of sales up until this point4.  However, at this point the costs of 
bribery becomes too high and firms begin to reduce evasion.   In effect, the tax rate 
4 The difference between the tax rate boundary of 18 percent and the actual boundary of 20.43 percent 
can be attributed to bribery arising from other activities as the measure of the bribery level includes all 
bribes, not just tax bribes.
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 creates an upper bound beyond which bribery is more expensive than simply paying the 
legitimate tax.
The IV Tobit estimation produce similar results to the least squares analysis.  The 
three variables of interest, brib_taxes, brsal_per, and brsal2, are statistically significant at 
the 1% level.  As in the other specifications, bribing to deal with taxes reduces the 
amount of sales reported.  Paying more in bribes also reduces sales reported, but only to a 
certain point at which the bribe costs becomes too great and paying taxes becomes the 
optimal strategy.  
Because the Tobit regression is a maximum likelihood procedure, the reported 
coefficients do not reflect the marginal effects like the coefficients for the least squares 
estimates.  Therefore the size of the effect, particularly for brib_taxes, may seem much 
different from the least squares estimates.  However, calculating the marginal effects for 
the Tobit procedure results in similar results to the least squares regressions.  Bribing to 
deal with taxes reduces sales reported by 7.01 percentage points.  Each additional percent 
of sales spent on bribery reduces reported sales by 0.696 percentage points.  However, 
once the bribe rate exceeds 20.74 percent of sales, firms begin to report more sales for tax 
purposes.
The results of the regression analysis are broadly confirmed by the propensity 
score matching analysis.  Table 4.6 presents summary statistics of firm characteristics by 
whether they bribed for tax purposes or not.  Differences in means are fairly small, 
indicating a close relationship between the groups and a good likelihood of finding 
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 appropriate matches between the groups for comparison.  The unconditional difference in 
mean sales reporting is -7.06 percentage points, with firms that do not bribe reporting 
93.26 percent of their sales and firms that do bribe reporting only 86.2 percent of their 
sales. 
The smaller sample propensity score regression shows that the firm's probability 
of engaging in bribery is parabolic in the percentage of sales devoted to all bribes, with 
the probability first increasing and then decreasing after the bribe cost becomes too great. 
This result is in line with results from the IV analysis showing evasion dropping off due 
to high bribe costs.  A greater bribe cost reduces or eliminates the gain from evasion and 
thus attenuates the need for bribery.  Similarly, being audited and having the attitude that 
taxes are an obstacle to doing business (tax_inpec and obst_taxreg/obst_hightax 
respectively) are associated with a greater probability of engaging in bribery.  Tax 
inspections provide more opportunities for bribery, while ambivalence toward taxes 
reduces the moral costs of tax bribery.  More established and foreign private firms (as 
compared to the omitted category of domestic private firms) are less likely to bribe to 
deal with taxes.
Propensity score matching is successful only if appropriate matches can be made 
between treated and untreated observations.  To achieve good matches, the propensity 
scores for both types of observations must share a common support.  Figure 4.1 shows 
the common support between firms engaging in bribery and those which do not for the 
small sample matching.  The distribution of the  treatment group is nearly uniform across
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 Table 4.6: Summary Statistics by Bribery to Deal with Taxes
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Bribed to deal with Taxes: No Yes
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Difference
Mining 5246 0.009 0.096 3046 0.010 0.097 0.000
Construction 5246 0.119 0.324 3046 0.125 0.330 -0.006
Transport/communication 5246 0.069 0.253 3046 0.063 0.242 0.006
Trade 5246 0.196 0.397 3046 0.223 0.416 -0.027
Business services 5246 0.122 0.327 3046 0.078 0.268 0.044
Hotels/restaurants 5246 0.065 0.246 3046 0.070 0.256 -0.005
Other service 5246 0.089 0.285 3046 0.072 0.259 0.017
5246 0.068 0.251 3046 0.118 0.322 -0.050
5246 0.017 0.129 3046 0.018 0.132 -0.001
5246 0.044 0.205 3046 0.045 0.207 -0.001
5246 0.011 0.106 3046 0.012 0.111 -0.001
5246 0.006 0.074 3046 0.007 0.085 -0.002
5246 0.013 0.112 3046 0.014 0.118 -0.001
5246 0.052 0.223 3046 0.053 0.223 0.000
5246 0.056 0.231 3046 0.046 0.209 0.011
5246 0.006 0.079 3046 0.003 0.057 0.003
5246 0.059 0.235 3046 0.045 0.207 0.014
Listed 5246 0.021 0.142 3046 0.015 0.123 0.005
Closed 5246 0.319 0.466 3046 0.244 0.430 0.075
Sole Prop. 5246 0.327 0.469 3046 0.398 0.490 -0.071
Partnership 5246 0.235 0.424 3046 0.265 0.441 -0.030
Public Sector 5246 0.067 0.251 3046 0.045 0.207 0.023
Other 5246 0.032 0.175 3046 0.033 0.179 -0.002
Domestic Private 5246 0.009 0.096 3046 0.857 0.350 -0.848
Foreign Private 5246 0.119 0.324 3046 0.098 0.298 0.020
State 5246 0.069 0.253 3046 0.044 0.206 0.025
5246 0.395 1.423 3046 1.474 2.717 -1.080
5246 0.434 0.496 3046 0.647 0.478 -0.213
5246 1.213 1.137 3046 1.764 1.046 -0.551
5246 1.483 1.161 3046 1.908 1.025 -0.425
5246 100.440 357.527 3046 81.734 284.266 18.706
5246 6.700 2.100 3046 6.081 1.963 0.619
5246 18.355 18.801 3046 14.468 15.482 3.886
5246 93.265 14.114 3046 86.201 18.985 7.064
Std. Dev. Std. Dev.
MF-Food
MF-Textile
MF-Garments
MF-Chemicals
MF-Plastics and rubber
MF-Non-metallic min. prod.
MF-Metals and metal prod.
MF-Machinery and equip.
MF-Electronics
MF-n.e.c
brsal_per
tax_inspec
obst_taxreg
obst_hightax
empfull
lnsales
yoper
rprt_sales
 Table 4.7: Propensity Score Regression Results
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Small Sample Large Sample
Variables
0.179***
(0.016)
brsal2 -0.004***
(0.001)
0.188***
(0.036)
0.199***
(0.020)
0.042**
(0.020)
0.007
(0.011)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.005*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001)
Closed 0.056 -0.039
(0.127) (0.052)
Sole Prop. 0.088 0.173***
(0.129) (0.052)
Partnership 0.113 0.110**
(0.129) (0.052)
Public Sector -0.368 -0.284
(0.588) (0.251)
Other 0.046 0.161**
(0.152) (0.064)
Foreign Private -0.097* 0.012
(0.055) (0.028)
State 0.219 0.144
(0.581) (0.249)
Constant -1.563*** -0.121
(0.245) (0.101)
Observations 8292 20862
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
brib_taxes brib_taxes
brsal_per
tax_inspec
obst_taxreg
obst_hightax
lnsales
empfull
yoper
 Figure 4.1: Propensity Score Matching Common Support
propensity scores, while untreated firms are positively skewed with a majority having 
low propensity scores.  However, both distributions completely overlap, providing close 
matches between groups across the entire range of  propensity scores. 
Table 8 provides the results of the propensity score matching.  Once again, this 
shows the entire sample of treated and untreated firms is on-support for both the large and 
small sample.  The difference in average percentage of sales reported for taxes before 
matching, -7.06 for the small sample and -9.09 for the large sample, is statistically 
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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
 significant at the 1 percent level.  After matching, while the average difference falls, the 
difference is still significant across matching techniques and sample sizes.  In the small 
sample, the matched mean difference in reported sales between the two groups is between 
-3.17 and -3.61 percentage points.  The large sample shows similar results, with matched 
mean differences between -7.54 and -7.95 percentage points.
These results show that firms that engage in bribery will typically report fewer 
sales for tax purposes.  Further, these results are similar in magnitude and significance to 
the regression analysis results which show bribery reduces the percentage of sales 
reported by between 3.9 and 6.76 percentage points.
Both the regression and matching analysis results are in line with the theoretical 
predictions showing firms decrease reporting of sales as the probability of facing a 
corrupt tax administrator increases.  Additionally, the regression analysis shows the 
ambiguous theoretical result on bribe size is non-linear as well.  Evasion first increases 
with bribe cost as firms can evade more if they pay more.  However, once the costs of 
bribery become too great, firm will rather report their income than incur those bribery 
cost and evasion falls.   While the theoretical result of bribe efficacy can not be addressed 
empirically with this data, this analysis has shown that the presented theoretical model 
does describe the relationship between bribery and tax evasion, at least in part.
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 Table 4.8: Propensity Score Matching Results
Conclusion
Corruption and tax evasion are two distinct problems that affect all governments.  
While these problems can exist separately, they can easily become entangled.  Corruption 
enables tax evasion by making it easier for taxpayers to hide their income.  Tax evasion 
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Unmatched Nearest Neighbor
Small Sample – Extended Matching Controls
Treated 86.20 86.20 86.20 86.22
Controls 93.26 89.80 89.81 89.39
Difference -7.06 -3.59 -3.61 -3.17
Std. Error (0.366) (0.752) (0.512) (0.555)
T-Stat -19.29 -4.78 -7.05 -5.72
On-Support 8292 8292 8292 8279
Large Sample – Limited Matching Controls
Treated 80.83 80.83 80.83 80.83
Controls 89.92 88.78 88.47 88.38
Difference -9.086 -7.951 -7.637 -7.546
Std. Error (0.299) (0.499) (0.341) (0.353)
T-Stat -30.35 -15.92 -22.38 -21.36
On-Support 20862 20862 20862 20862
Kernel – 
Gaussian
Kernel - 
Epanechnikov
 can also contribute to corruption by creating additional opportunities for corruption to 
thrive.  To address both issues, policymakers must understand the relationship between  
the problems.  Using instrument regression analysis and propensity score matching, this 
study attempts to identifies the effect of corruption on tax evasion and provides evidence 
that corruption is a driver of evasion.
Corruption of tax officials is a statistically and economically significance 
determinant of tax evasion.  Tax inspectors who request bribes result in reduction of sales 
reported for taxes of between 3 and 8 percentage points.  Additionally, larger bribes result 
in higher levels of evasion.  These results give support to the argument that tax 
compliance is dependent on the quality of the tax enforcers.  Corruption effectively 
negate any reductions in evasion from establishing higher audit rates and penalties, the 
traditional enforcement measures used to increase compliance rates.  The rules do not 
matter if no one bothers to enforce them.  As a result, policymakers cannot attack tax 
evasion and expect results without addressing potential corruption issues first.
While corruption increases tax evasion, very high levels of corruption can create 
an atmosphere conducive to compliance.  Unless the firm is being extorted by a corrupt  
tax official, once the costs of evading taxes grow greater than the costs of paying taxes 
the rational firm can simply comply with the law and avoid paying bribes.  As a result, in 
situations in which the firm must pay a bribe rate to corrupt officials in excess of the tax 
rate, evasion rates begin to fall.
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 These results indicate that governments seeking to increase their tax revenues 
should first ensure their tax administration is honest.  Corrupt tax administrations not 
only cause tax shortfalls through increased evasion on part of the tax payers, but they can 
also appropriate some portion the collected taxes due to the government.  An honest tax 
administration enforces the existing tax laws effectively reducing evasion and remits all 
tax collections to the government.  While this study only focuses on corruption's role in 
increasing evasion, addressing corruption serves to ameliorate both potential problems.  
Additionally, an honest tax administration allows policymakers to pursue a variety of 
other tax reforms designed to reduce evasion with the confidence that those reforms will 
be properly implemented.
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 Table 4.A1: Country and Year Fixed Effects Results 
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OLS IV IV-Tobit
 Albania -8.538*** -14.498*** -25.009***
(2.894) (2.257) (3.736)
 Belarus 4.256 -1.726 -4.494
(2.600) (1.680) (4.879)
 Tajikistan 7.353*** 2.374* 2.978
(2.376) (1.418) (4.025)
 Turkey -13.426*** -19.413*** -36.999***
(3.079) (2.430) (3.987)
 Ukraine 3.044 -2.696* -4.672
(2.356) (1.386) (3.607)
 Uzbekistan 11.924*** 6.598*** 25.266***
(2.158) (0.990) (5.046)
 Russia -1.754 -6.871*** -13.560***
(2.417) (1.507) (3.362)
 Poland 3.712* -2.418*** -12.333***
(2.120) (0.832) (2.636)
 Romania 5.021** -1.126 -7.478**
(2.209) (0.962) (3.134)
 Serbia -0.525 -5.038** -12.763**
(3.005) (2.523) (5.458)
 Kazakhstan 8.679*** 3.943*** 10.796***
(2.187) (1.026) (3.487)
 Moldova 1.336 -4.193*** -14.809***
(2.448) (1.514) (3.551)
 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.368 -2.853 -5.431
(3.398) (2.988) (6.413)
 FYR Macedonia -7.427** -13.390*** -26.932***
(3.468) (2.947) (5.091)
 Armenia 12.543*** 7.223*** 15.310***
(2.130) (0.943) (3.355)
3.114 -2.149 -3.127
(2.702) (1.927) (4.117)
 Estonia 6.305*** -0.233 -10.548***
(2.160) (0.850) (3.659)
 Czech Republic -0.345 -6.699*** -19.354***
(2.483) (1.509) (3.311)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 Kyrgyz Republic
 Table 4.A1 – cnt.: Country and Year Fixed Effects Results 
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OLS IV IV-Tobit
 Hungary 1.148 -4.898*** -17.992***
(2.282) (1.171) (3.089)
 Latvia 6.258*** -0.276 -5.075
(2.306) (1.243) (4.165)
 Lithuania 2.131 -4.327** -15.983***
(2.575) (1.695) (4.008)
 Slovak Republic 8.411*** 2.531** 5.207
(2.285) (1.186) (5.209)
 Slovenia 2.295 -4.029*** -18.470***
(2.344) (1.249) (3.506)
 Bulgaria 0.002 -6.474*** -15.885***
(2.583) (1.862) (3.932)
 Croatia 2.978 -1.909 -10.127**
(2.437) (1.263) (4.018)
 Germany 2.215*** 3.900*** -15.827***
(0.780) (0.698) (2.297)
 Portugal 2.062* 4.498*** -5.447*
(1.059) (1.039) (3.121)
 South Korea -1.951** -20.164***
(0.931) (2.537)
 Ireland 4.973** -1.385** -11.560***
(2.119) (0.589) (2.651)
 Georgia -4.919** -14.593***
(2.146) (5.106)
 Greece 2.498*** -12.973***
(0.966) (2.724)
 Spain 6.079***
(2.122)
Year 2004 2.956
(2.177)
Year 2005 4.983***
(0.743)
Constant 90.244*** 92.413*** 137.397***
(2.828) (2.125) (6.928)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 Chapter 5: Conclusion
The results of the previous three chapters suggest that policy makers should focus 
on tax reforms that first serve to increase the quality of the tax administration and next to 
simplify the tax code to make compliance as easy as possible.  These chapters give 
evidence that poor or corrupt tax administrations can reduce government revenues, 
negatively affect growth, and enable tax evasion.  Under the rational crime framework of 
tax evasion, increasing enforcement effort results in lower evasion and higher collections. 
However, this model has been shown to be incomplete and tax reforms proposed within 
this framework, consisting of only higher audits and penalties, are unlikely to fully 
address revenue shortfalls.  Instead, efforts to increase tax collection efficiency should 
focus on administrative and tax code reforms within a service framework that emphasizes 
helping the taxpayer to comply (Alm and Martinez-Vazquez 2003).
In examining the determinants of the tax gap, this study finds that unintentional 
evasion, stemming from a complex tax code, and tax administration inefficiency and 
corruption reduce tax revenues.  Service oriented reforms can address both these issues, 
providing a larger return on reform than an enforcement oriented approach that only 
addresses willful evasion.  A competent and honest tax administration is able to 
efficiently enforce the existing tax code, reducing the need for additional measures that 
are not efficiency enhancing, such as higher tax rates.  Importantly, a more efficient tax 
administration is able to increase revenues without putting more resources into tax 
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 enforcement.
The second part of this study demonstrates why increasing collections without 
adding resources to enforcement can be desirable.  Economic growth can be achieved 
through generating higher tax collection ratios.  However, higher tax collection ratios 
generated by a focus on enforcement, increasing audit rates and penalties, may have a 
counterproductive outcome on growth.  Resources used in evading and enforcing the tax 
code are unavailable for other productive uses.  By treating the tax payer as a client and 
providing assistance in accurately paying taxes, officials can increase tax collections 
without resorting to enforcement measures which result in the use of productive resources 
in tax compliance.
The service paradigm, by making resources of the government available to 
taxpayers and streamlining the compliance procedures, also results in the freeing of 
private resources for productive uses.  This achieves the same direct results on growth as 
reductions in evasion costs or lower audit rates.  While the service paradigm maintains 
the compliance obligations, it allows the taxpayer to meet it at a lower cost and use the 
savings to invest in productive resources.
Further, these results are achieved without other negative side effects.  Higher 
corruption levels may lower the costs of evasion and free resources, thus stimulating 
growth, but this is only a small and specific channel of the many through which 
corruption can operate.  Corruption has many other costs and the general overall effect of 
corruption on growth is generally considered to be negative.  A tax administration 
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 implementing a service oriented approach to tax compliance avoids these types of 
negative effects.
Tax administration corruption is also positively associated with tax evasion which 
serves to reduce tax collections.  While the positive correlation is an obvious result, this 
study shows that corruption causes elevated levels of evasion instead of tax evasion 
causing corruption. As a result, tax reforms focusing on effective and honest 
administration can serve to address both problems.  By reducing corruption, 
policymakers also reduce evasion, thereby receiving better returns on reform than by 
focusing solely on evasion.
The importance of good tax administration is not a new result.  Poor tax 
administration has adversely affected governments throughout history.  Without good 
administration, governments must rely on ineffectual and heavy handed tactics to raise 
revenue, but even still run the risk of not raising enough.  Effective tax administration 
that raises the appropriate revenues while minimizing the burdens on the population is 
not only beneficial to the government, but also to society as a whole.   
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